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Abstract
This paper investigates a connection between the semantic notion
provided by the ordering ⊳∗ among theories in model theory and the
syntactic (N)SOPn hierarchy of Shelah. It introduces two proper-
ties which are natural extensions of this hierarchy, called SOP2 and
SOP1. It is shown here that SOP3 implies SOP2 implies SOP1. In
[Sh 500] it was shown that SOP3 implies ⊳
∗-maximality and we prove
here that ⊳∗-maximality in a model of GCH implies a property called
SOP′′2. It has been subsequently shown by Shelah and Usvyatsov that
SOP′′2 and SOP2 are equivalent, so obtaining an implication between
⊳∗-maximality and SOP2. It is not known if SOP2 and SOP3 are
equivalent.
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Together with the known results about the connection between
the (N)SOPn hierarchy and the existence of universal models in the
absence of GCH, the paper provides a step toward the classification
of unstable theories without the strict order property. 1
Changes from the published version:
In the published version of this paper it is claimed that witnesses
to being SOP1 can be chosen to be highly indiscernible, and this is
justified by a certain notion of 1-fbti. The definition of this notion
(Definition 2.10) has a typo in a crucial place, and in addition Claim
2.11 for t = 2 is incorrect and for t = 1 the proof is incomplete. In
this version we clarify these statements and proofs by introducting a
new notion of indescernibility 3-fbti. The corrected statement is that
witnesses to being SOP1 can be chosen to be 3-fbti.
That there are inconsistencies in the notions we used in the original
paper was first observed by Lynn Scowl (September 2008), Byunghan
Kim (May 2009) and Enrique Casanovas and Martin Ziegler (July
2010). Whilst a Ph.D. student at UEA in 2008, Mark Wong also
observed some incosistencies and made partial progress in rectifying
them. There is a paper by Kim and Kim (to appear in APAL as of
March 2011) which gives a different notion of 1-fbti and shows that
witnesses can be chosen with that kind of indiscernibility.
0 Introduction
This paper investigates a connection between the ordering ⊳∗ among theories
in model theory and the (N)SOPn hierarchy of Shelah and as such provides
a step toward the classification of unstable theories without the strict order
property. The thesis we pursue is that the syntactic property SOP2 is closely
1 This publication is numbered 692 in the list of publications of Saharon Shelah. The
authors thank the United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation for a grant support-
ing this research and the NSF USA for their grant numbered NSF-DMS97-04477. Mirna
Dzˇamonja thanks EPSRC for their support through grant number GR/M71121, as well as
the Royal Society for their support through grant number SV/ISR/NVB. We would also
like to acknowledge the support of the Erdo¨s Research Center in Budapest, during the
Workshop on Set-theoretic Topology, July 1999, and support of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem and the Academic Study Group during July 1999. Finally, warm thanks are
due to Alex Usvyatsov for his comments and improvements to the manuscript.
Keywords: classification theory, unstable theories, SOP hierarchy, oak property.
AMS 2000 Classification: 03C45, 03C55.
2
related to the semantic property of being maximal in the ⊳∗-order. We
shall now give the relevant definitions and explain the motivation behind the
paper as well as noting our main results. For the purpose of this introductory
discussion we shall limit ourselves to countable (complete first order) theories.
The following order among theories was introduced and investigated by
Keisler in [Ke].
Definition 0.1 (1) For any cardinal λ, the Keisler order ⋖λ among theories
is defined as follows: T0 ⋖λ T1 if whenever Ml(l < 2) is a model of T0, T1
respectively and D is a regular ultrafilter over λ, then the λ+-compactness
of Mλ1 /D implies the λ
+-compactness of Mλ0 /D.
(2) We say T0 ⋖ T1 if for all λ we have T0 ⋖λ T1.
The relevance of this order to the project of classifying unstable theories
without strict order property lies in the two following theorems of Shelah
(note that the second one implies the first).
Theorem 0.2 (Shelah [Sh c], VI4.3) Any (countable) theory with the strict
order property is ⋖-maximal.
As stated in [Sh c], pg xiv, Ch VI of [Sh c] gives a rather complete picture
of Keisler’s order and to complete it we should know more about unstable
theories without the strict order property. Paper [Sh 500] started a classifi-
cation of such theories by introducing the hierarchy SOPn for n ≥ 3 and in
particular it is stated there that being maximal in the Keisler order is not a
characterisation of theories with the strict order property,
Theorem 0.3 (Shelah [Sh 500], see also [ShUs 844]) Any theory with SOP3
is ⋖-maximal.
Details of the proof are given in [ShUs 844]. Precise definitions of prop-
erties SOPn for n ≥ 3 will be repeated below in §2 but for the moment we
note that it was proved in [Sh 500] that for n ≥ 3
strict order property =⇒ SOPn+1 =⇒ SOPn =⇒ not simple
and that all the implications are irreversible. One may now wonder if having
SOP3 is a characterisation of theories that are maximal in the Keisler order,
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giving us a semantic equivalent to the syntactic notion of SOP3. This would
be consistent with what is known about this order, see the Introduction to
Ch VI of [Sh c]. This question remains open but instead one may attempt
to give a characterisation of SOP3 or SOPn in terms of some other similarly
defined order. This is suggested by [Sh 500] which in fact gives a theorem
stronger than 0.3, namely
Theorem 0.4 (Shelah [Sh 500], see also [ShUs 844]) Any theory with SOP3
is ⊳∗-maximal.
The definition of this order will be recalled in §1 where we shall also prove
that being ⊳∗-maximal implies being maximal in the Keisler order. Given
this fact one may now ask if being ⊳∗-maximal characterises theories with
SOP3. To test this claim it is natural to investigate a prototypical example of
an NSOP3 theory that is still not simple, which is T
∗
feq. In §1 we shall recall
the definition of this theory and show that in fact it is not ⊳∗-maximal, as it
is consistently strictly below the theory of a dense linear order with no first
or last element (all we need for the consistency is a partial GCH assumption).
This naturally leads to the question of the possibility of refining the dis-
tinction between simplicity and SOP3. Definition of the SOPn hierarchy
from [Sh 500] does not immediately give way to such a refinement as SOPn
is roughly speaking, defined in terms of omitting loops of size n. However in
§2 we introduce two properties SOP2 and SOP1 that in fact satisfy
SOP3 =⇒ SOP2 =⇒ SOP1 =⇒ not simple.
We then ask if these properties in any way characterise the maximality in ⊳∗.
To this end in §3 we prove that any theory that is ⊳∗-maximal in a model of a
sufficient amount of GCH must satisfy a syntactic property SOP′′2. Together
with a subsequent result of Shelah and Usvyatsov in [ShUs 844] that proved
that SOP′′2 is equivalent to SOP2 we hence obtain that ⊳
∗-maximality in any
model of a sufficiently rich fragment of GCH implies SOP2. (See §3 for the
definition of SOP′′2 and the exact reference from [ShUs 844]). To summarise,
our main result, appearing as Corollary 3.9(1) below is
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Theorem 0.5 Suppose that T is a theory that is ⊳∗-maximal in some uni-
verse of set theory in which 2λ = λ+ holds for all large enough regular λ.
Then T has SOP2.
Several questions remain open. The main one of course is if SOP2 is
actually equivalent to ⊳∗-maximality. Recall from the discussion above that
we know that SOP3 implies⊳
∗-maximality. It is not known if SOP3 and SOP2
are actually equivalent. We also note that Shelah and Usvyatsov have proved
in [ShUs 844] a local version of the implication SOP2 =⇒ ⊳
∗ −maximality,
see §3 for a more detailed discussion.
A burning question also is that we in fact do not know almost anything
about the reverse of other implications in the (consistent) diagram
SOP3 =⇒ ⊳
∗ −maximality =⇒ SOP2 =⇒ SOP1 =⇒ not simple,
apart that not all of them may be equivalences, as T ∗feq is not simple but is
NSOP3. In fact [ShUs 844] proves that T
∗
feq is not even SOP1.
Before laying down the organisation of the paper let us also mention the
connection of the SOPn hierarchy with another semantic property, which is
the possibility of having a universal model at λ in some universe of set the-
ory where a sufficient amount of GCH fails (under GCH every countable first
order theory has a universal model in every uncountable cardinal). The con-
nection between this property and unstable theories without the strict order
property has been investigated in a series of papers, notably in [KjSh 409]
where it is proved that if GCH fails sufficiently then there are no universal
dense linear orders. It was proved in [Sh 500] that SOP4 is already sufficient
for such a negative universality result. The question of universality is inter-
esting also for classes that are not elementary classes of models of a first order
theory, for example for classes without amalgamation the most interesting
case is the strong limit singular µ of cofinality ℵ0. In [GrSh 174] it is proved
that for such µ and λ < µ a strongly compact cardinal the class of models
of any Lλ,µ-theory of cardinality < µ admits a universal model of cardinal-
ity µ. A rather detailed description of what is known about the connection
of unstable theories without the strict order property and the universality
problem may be found in the introduction to [DjSh 710].
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The paper is organised as follows. In the first section we investigate the
theory T ∗feq. This is simply the model completion of the theory of infinitely
many parametrised equivalence relations. We show that under a partial GCH
assumption, this theory is not maximal with respect to ⊳∗λ, as it is strictly
below the theory of a dense linear order. In the second section of the paper
we extend Shelah’s NSOPn hierarchy by introducing two further properties
SOP1 and SOP2, and we show that their names are justified by their position
in the hierarchy. Namely SOP3 =⇒ SOP2 =⇒ SOP1. Furthermore, SOP1
theories are not simple. The last section of the paper contains the main
result showing that ⊳∗-maximality in a model of a sufficiently rich fragment
of GCH implies SOP′′2, and hence SOP2 by Shelah-Usvyatsov.
The following conventions will be used in the paper.
Convention 0.6 Unless specified otherwise, a “theory” stands for a first
order complete theory. An unattributed T stands for a theory. We use
τ(T ) to denote the vocabulary of a theory T , and L(T ) to denote the set of
formulae of T .
By C = CT we denote a κ¯-saturated model of T , for a large enough
regular cardinal κ¯ and we assume that any models of T that we mention are
elementary submodels of C.
λ, µ, κ stand for infinite cardinals.
1 On the order ⊳∗λ
Definition 1.1 (1) For (first order complete) theories T0 and T we say that
ϕ¯ = 〈ϕR(x¯R) : R a predicate of τ(T0) or a function symbol of τ(T0) or =〉,
(where we have x¯R = (x0, . . . xn(R)−1)), interprets T0 in T , or that ϕ¯ is an
interpretation of T0 in T , or that
T ⊢ “ϕ¯ is a model of T0”,
if each ϕR(x¯R) ∈ L(T ), and for any M |= T , the model M
[ϕ¯] described below
is a model of T0. Here, N = M
[ϕ¯] is a τ(T0) model, whose set of elements
6
is {a : M |= ϕ=(a, a)} (so M
[ϕ¯] ⊆ M) and RN = {a¯ : M |= ϕR[a¯]} for a
predicate R of T0.
For any function symbol f of τ(T0) we have that N |= “f(a¯) = b” iff
M |= ϕf(a¯, b), while
M |= “ϕf(a¯, b) = ϕf (a¯, c) =⇒ b = c”
for all a¯, b, c.
(2) We say that the interpretation ϕ¯ is trivial if ϕR(x¯R) = R(x¯R) for all
R ∈ τ(T0), so M
[ϕ¯] =M ↾ τ(T0), for any model M of T .
(The last clause in Definition 1.1(1) shows that we can in fact restrict
ourselves to vocabularies without function or constant symbols.)
We use the notion of interpretations to define a certain relation among
theories. This relation was introduced by S. Shelah in [Sh 500], section §2
and one can see [ShUs 844] for a more detailed exposition. The reason we are
interested in this ordering is Shelah’s Theorem 0.3 quoted in the Introduction
and we shall now start developing methods for the proof of our main result
3.9.
Definition 1.2 For (complete first order) theories T0, T1 we define:
(1) A triple (T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1) is called a (T0, T1)-superior iff T is a theory and ϕ¯l
is an interpretation of Tl in T , for l < 2.
(2) For a cardinal κ, a (T0, T1)-superior (T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1) is called κ-relevant iff
|T | < κ.
(3) For regular cardinals λ, µ we say T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1 if there is a min(µ, λ)-
relevant (T0, T1)-superior triple (T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1) such that in every model M
of T in which M [ϕ¯1] is µ-saturated, the model M [ϕ¯0] is λ-saturated. If
this happens, we call the triple a witness for T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1.
(4) We say that T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1 over θ if θ ≤ λ, θ ≤ µ and T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1 as witnessed
by a (T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1) with |T | < θ.
(5) If λ = µ, we write ⊳∗λ in place of ⊳
∗
λ,µ.
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(6) We say that T1 ⊳
∗ T2 iff T1 ⊳
∗
λ T2 holds for all large enough regular λ.
(6) T ∗ is ⊳∗λ-maximal iff T ⊳
∗
λ T
∗ holds for all T . The notion of ⊳∗-
maximality is defined analogously.
(7) We say T0 ⊳
∗
λ, 6= T1 iff T0 ⊳
∗
λ T1 but ¬(T1 ⊳
∗
λ T0).
Although in this paper we do not consider this in its own right, it is
natural to define the local versions of the ⊳∗-relation. This is used by Shelah
and Usvyatsov in [ShUs 844] to obtain their local converse to the implication
⊳∗-maximality =⇒ SOP2, see §3 for more discussion on this.
Definition 1.3 Relations ⊳∗,lλ,µ and ⊳
∗,l
λ are the local versions of ⊳
∗
λ,µ and
⊳∗λ respectively, where by a local version we mean that in the definition of
the relations, only types of the form
p ⊆ {±ϑ(x, a¯) : a¯ ∈ lg(y¯)M}
for some fixed ϑ(x, y¯) are considered.
Observation 1.4 (0) If T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1 and l < 2, then there is a witness
(T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1) such that ϕ¯l is trivial, hence Tl ⊆ T .
(1) ⊳∗λ is a partial order among theories (note that T ⊳
∗
λ T for every complete
T of size < λ, and that the strict inequality is written as T1 ⊳
∗
λ, 6= T2).
(2) If T0 ⊳
∗
λ,µ T1 over θ and T1 ⊳
∗
µ,κ T2 over θ, then T0 ⊳
∗
λ,κ T2 over θ.
[Why? (0) Trivial.
(1) Suppose that Tl ⊳
∗
λ Tl+1 for l < 2 over θ, as exemplified by (T
∗, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1)
and (T ∗∗, ψ¯1, ψ¯2) respectively. Without loss of generality, ϕ¯1 is trivial (apply
part (0)), so as T ∗ is complete we have T1 ⊆ T
∗. Similarly, without loss of
generality, ψ¯1 is trivial and so, as T
∗∗ is complete, we have T1 ⊆ T
∗∗. As
T1 is complete, without loss of generality, T
∗ and T ∗∗ agree on the common
part of their vocabularies, and hence by Robinson Consistency Criterion,
T
def
= T ∗ ∪ T ∗∗ is consistent. Also |T ∗| + |T ∗∗| < θ, hence |T | < θ. Clearly
T interprets T0, T1, T2 by ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1 = ψ¯1 and ψ¯2 respectively and T is com-
plete. We now show that the triple (T, ϕ¯0, ψ¯2) is a (T0, T2)-superior which
witnesses T0 ⊳
∗
λ T2 over θ. So suppose that M is a model of T in which
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M [ψ¯2] is λ-saturated. As (T ∗∗, ψ¯1, ψ¯2) witnesses T1 ⊳
∗
λ T2, we can conclude
that M [ϕ¯1] = M [ψ¯1] is λ-saturated. We can argue similarly that M [ϕ¯0] is
λ-saturated.
(2) is proved similarly to (1).]
In this section we consider an example of a theory which is a prototypical
example of an NSOP3 theory that is not simple (see [Sh 457]). It is the model
completion of the theory of infinitely many (independent) parametrised equiv-
alence relations, formally defined below. We shall prove that for λ such that
λ = λ<λ and 2λ = λ+, this theory is strictly ⊳∗
λ+
-below the theory of a dense
linear order with no first or last element.
Definition 1.5 (1) Tfeq is the following theory in {P,Q,E,R, F}
(a) Predicates P and Q are unary and disjoint, and (∀x) [P (x) ∨Q(x)],
(b) E is an equivalence relation on Q,
(c) R is a binary relation on Q× P such that
[xR z & y R z & xE y] =⇒ x = y.
(so R picks for each z ∈ P (at most one) representative of any E-equivalence class).
(d) F is a (partial) binary function from Q× P to Q, which satisfies
F (x, z) ∈ Q & F (x, z)Rz & xE F (x, z).
(so for x ∈ Q and z ∈ P , the function F picks the representative of the E-equivalence class of x
which is in the relation R with z).
(2) T+feq is Tfeq with the requirement that F is total.
(3) For n < ω, we let T nfeq be T
+
feq enriched by the sentence saying that over
any n elements, any (not necessarily complete) quantifier free type consist-
ing of basic (atomic and negations of the atomic) formulae with no direct
contradictions, is realised.
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Note 1.6 One may easily check that every model of Tfeq can be extended to
a model of T+feq and that T
+
feq has the amalgamation property and the joint
embedding property. This theory also has a model completion, which can be
constructed directly, and which we denote by T ∗feq. It follows that T
∗
feq is a
complete theory with infinite models, in which F is a full function.
Remark 1.7 Notice that Tfeq has been defined somewhat differently than
in [Sh 457, §1], but the difference is non-essential, as the following Claim 1.8
shows that the two theories have the same model completion. This claim
also shows the origin of the name “infinitely many independent equivalence
relations” for T ∗feq.
Claim 1.8 Let T be the theory defined (in [Sh457, 1]) by
(a) T has unary predicates P and Q and a three place relation E writen as
y Exz,
(b) the universe of any model of T is a disjoint union of P and Q,
(c) y Exz =⇒ P (x) & Q(y), Q(z),
(d) for any fixed x ∈ P the relation Ex is an equivalence relation on Q.
Then T ∗feq is the model completion of T .
Proof of the Claim. Let M be a model of Tfeq, we shall extend M to a
model of T as follows. Each E-equivalence class e = a/E gives rise to an
equivalence relation Ee on P given by:
z1Eez2 iff z1, z2 ∈ P and F (a, z1) = F (a, z2).
This definition does not depend on a, just on a/E. Let PN and QN be QM
and PM respectively. Define y ENx z iff y Eez where e = x/E
M . Clearly N is
a model of T .
Now suppose that we have a model M of T and we shall extend it to
a model N of Tfeq. Let P
N and QN be QM and PM respectively. Define
xENx′ iff for every y, z we have y Exz iff y Ex′z. Choose a representative of
each E-equivalence class and for any z ∈ QN and such a representative x let
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F (x, z) = x. Then for x′ ∈ QN which has not been chosen as a representative
of any equivalence class, find x which has been chosen as its representative
and define F (x′, z) = F (x, z) for all z ∈ PN .
This shows that Tfeq and T are cotheories ([ChKe], 3.5.6(2)). Being the
model completion of Tfeq, T
∗
feq is its cotheory, and hence a cotheory of T .
Hence T ∗feq is a model companion of T . In order to prove that it is the model
completion of T it suffices to show that T has the amalgamation property
([ChKe], 3.5.18) which is easily seen directly. ⋆1.8
Observation 1.9 T ∗feq has elimination of quantifiers and for any n, any
model of T ∗feq is a model of T
n
feq.
Notation 1.10 Tord stands for the theory of a dense linear order with no
first or last element.
The following convention will make the notation used in this section sim-
pler.
Convention 1.11 Whenever considering (Tord, T
∗
feq)-superiors (T, ϕ¯, ψ¯) we
shall abuse the notation and assume ϕ¯ = (I, <0) and ψ¯ = (P,Q,E,R, F ). In
such a case we may also write PM in place of PM
[ψ¯]
etc., and we may simply
say that T is a (Tord, T
∗
feq)-superior.
We intend to prove that for λ satisfying λ<λ and 2λ = λ+ the theory
T ∗feq is strictly ⊳
∗
λ+
-below Tord (Theorem 1.17 below). This will be done by
a diagonalisation argument where for a given λ-relevant (Tord, T
∗
feq)-superior
T we inductively construct a model of T that is saturated for T ∗feq but not
for Tord. Main Claim 1.13 provides one step in the required induction. In
Stage A of its proof we use the elimination of quantifiers in T ∗feq to reduce
the situation to Tfeq-types of four prescribed kinds, and then we show that
we may in fact work only with three of them. Stage B contains the main
point of the proof, which is the construction of a certain tree of models and
embeddings. Once this is done in Stage C we use the analysis from Stage A to
show that the T ∗feq-type defined by the union of the embeddings is consistent.
In Stage D we take N ≺ C of size λ that realises this type and show that
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N must omit most of the Dedekind cuts induced by the tree of embeddings,
and that most of these cuts are not definable over N . After an application of
an appropriate automorphism of C this finishes the proof of the Main Claim.
The proof of the theorem then follows by induction. The cardinal arithmetic
assumptions are used in Stage D and in the inductive proof of the theorem.
Definition 1.12 For a λ-relevant (Tord, T
∗
feq)- superior T , the statement
∗[M, a¯, b¯] = ∗[M, a¯, b¯, T, λ]
means:
(i) M is a model of T of size λ,
(ii) a¯ = 〈ai : i < λ〉, b¯ = 〈bi : i < λ〉, are sequences of elements of I
M [ϕ¯]
such that
i < j < λ =⇒ ai <0 aj <0 bj <0 bi,
(iii) there is no x ∈M [ϕ¯] such that for all i we have ai <0 x <0 bi,
(iv) the Dedekind cut {x :
∨
i<λ x <0 ai} is not definable by any formula of
L(M) with parameters in M .
Main Claim 1.13 Assume λ<λ = λ and (T, ϕ¯, ψ¯) is a λ-relevant (Tord, T
∗
feq)-
superior. Further assume that ∗[M, a¯, b¯] holds, and p = p(z) is a (consistent)
T ∗feq-type over M
[ψ¯]. Then there is N |= T with M ≺ N , such that p(z) is
realised in N [ψ¯] and ∗[N, a¯, b¯] holds.
Proof of the Main Claim.
Stage A. Without loss of generality, p is complete in the T ∗feq-language
over M [ψ¯]. (By Convention 1.11, we can consider p to be a type over M
(rather than M [ψ¯]). We shall use this Convention throughout the proof). If
p is realised in M , our conclusion follows by taking N = M , so let us assume
that this is not the case. Using the elimination of quantifiers for T ∗feq, we
can without loss of generality assume that p(z) consists of quantifier free
formulae with parameters in M . This means that one of the following four
cases must happen:
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Case 1. (This will be the main case) p(z) implies that z ∈ P and it
determines which elements of QM are R-connected to z. Hence for some
function f : QM → QM which respects E, i.e.
aE b =⇒ f(a) = f(b),
and
f(a) ∈ a/EM ;
we have
p(z) = {P (z)} ∪ { bR z : b ∈ Rang(f)}
and no a ∈ PM satisfies p.
Case 1A. Like Case 1, but f is a partial function and
p(z) = {P (z)} ∪ { f(b)Rz : b ∈ Dom(f)}
∪ {¬(bR z) : (b/EM ∩ Rang(f)) = ∅}.
(This Case will be reduced to Cases 1-3 in Subclaim 1.15).
Case 2. p(z) determines that z ∈ Q and that it is E-equivalent to some
a∗ ∈ QM , but not equal to any “old” element. Note that in this case if
b∗ realises p(z), we cannot have b∗Rc for any c ∈ PM , as this would imply
F (a∗, c) = b∗ ∈ M [ψ¯] (and we have assumed that p is not realised in M [ψ¯]).
Hence, the complete M-information is given by
p(z) = {Q(z)} ∪ {a∗E z} ∪ {a 6= z : a ∈ a∗/EM}.
Case 3. p(z) determines that z ∈ Q, but it has a different E-equivalence
class than any of the elements of QM . As p is complete, it must deter-
mine for which c ∈ PM we have z R c, and for which c, d ∈ PM we have
F (z, c) = F (z, d). Hence, for some f : PM → {yes, no} and some E , an
equivalence relation on PM such that cEd =⇒ f(c) = f(d), we have
p = {Q(z)} ∪ {¬(a E z) : a ∈ QM} ∪ {(z R b)f(b) : b ∈ PM}
∪{(F (z, c) = F (z, d))ifcEd : c, d ∈ PM}.
In the above description, we have used
Notation 1.14 For a formula ϑ we let ϑyes ≡ ϑ and ϑno ≡ ¬ϑ.
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Subclaim 1.15 It suffices to deal with Cases 1,2,3, ignoring the Case 1A.
Proof of the Subclaim. Suppose that we are in the Case 1A. Let
{di/E
M : i < i∗ ≤ λ}
list the d/EM for d ∈ QM such that d′ ∈ d/EM =⇒ ¬(d′Rz) ∈ p(z). We
choose by induction on i ≤ i∗ a pair (Mi, ci) such that
(a) M0 = M , ||Mi|| = λ,
(b) 〈Mi : i ≤ i
∗〉 is an increasing continuous elementary chain,
(c) ∗[Mi, a¯, b¯]
(d) ci ∈ (di/E
Mi+1) \Mi, for i < i
∗.
For i limit or i = 0, the choice is trivial. For the situation when i is a
successor, we use Case 2.
Let 〈ci/E
Mi∗ : i ∈ [i∗, i∗∗)〉 list without repetitions the c/EMi∗ which are
disjoint to M . Note that |i∗∗| ≤ λ. Let
p+(z)
def
= p(z) ∪ {ciRz : i < i
∗∗}.
Then p+(z) is a complete type (for M
[ψ¯]
i∗ ), and ∗[Mi∗ , a¯, b¯] holds by (c). If
p+(z) is realised in Mi∗ , we can let N = Mi∗ and we are done. Otherwise,
p+(z) is not realised in Mi∗ and is a type of the form required in Case 1, so
we can proceed to deal with it using the assumptions on Case 1. ⋆1.15
Stage B. Let us assume that p is a type as in one of the Cases 1,2 or 3,
which we can do by Subclaim 1.15. We shall define 〈Mα : α < λ〉, an ≺-
increasing continuous sequence of elementary submodels of M , each of size
< λ, and with union M , such that:
(a) In Case 1, each Mα is closed under f ,
(b) In Case 2, a∗ ∈M0,
(c) For every α < λ,
(Mα, {(aj, bj) : j < λ} ∩Mα) ≺ (M, {(aj , bj) : j < λ}),
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Hence, for some club C of λ consisting of limit ordinals δ, we have that
for all δ ∈ C,
aj ∈Mδ ⇐⇒ bj ∈Mδ ⇐⇒ j < δ,
(∀c ∈ IMδ)(∃j < δ) [c <0 aj ∨ bj <0 c].
Let C = {δi : i < λ} be an increasing continuous enumeration.
Now we come to the main point of the proof.
By induction on i = lg(η) < λ we shall choose h¯ = 〈hη : η ∈
λ>2〉, a
sequence such that
(α) hη is an elementary embedding of Mδlg(η) into CT , whose range will be
denoted by Nη.
(β) ν ⊳ η =⇒ hν ⊆ hη.
(γ) If ηl ∈
λ>2 for l = 0, 1 and η0 ∩ η1 = η, then:
(i) Nη0 ∩Nη1 = Nη.
(ii) In addition, if al ∈ Q
Nηl for l = 0, 1 and a0E
CT a1, then for some
a ∈ QNη we have alE
CT a for l = 0, 1. (Equivalently, if al ∈ Q
Nηl
and ¬(∃a ∈ Nη)(∧l<2al E a), then ¬(a0E a1)).
(δ) |= “hη⌢〈0〉(bδlg(η)) <0 hη⌢〈1〉(aδlg(η))” (see Convention 1.11 on <0).
Note that the requirement of hη being elementary and onto Nη in partic-
ular implies that
(δ′) If for some l < 2 and η ∈ λ>2 we have a ∈ Nη⌢〈l〉 \Nη and b ∈ Nη, then
aECT b iff a = hη⌢〈l〉(a
′) for some a′ such that a′ECTh−1η (b).
We now describe the inductive choice of hη for η ∈
λ>2, the induction
being on i = lg(η). Let h〈〉 = idM0 . If i is a limit ordinal, we just let
hη
def
=
⋃
j<lg(η) hη↾j . Hence, the point is to handle the successor case.
Fixing i < λ, let 〈ηi,α : α < α
∗ ≤ λ〉 list i+12, in such a manner that
ηi,2α ↾ i = ηi,2α+1 ↾ i and ηi,2α+l(i) = l for l < 2 (we are using the assumption
λ<λ = λ). Now we choose hηi,2α+l by induction on α. Hence, coming to α, let
us denote by ηl the sequence ηi,2α+l, and let η0∩η1 = η (so η0 ↾ i = η1 ↾ i = η).
Let Mδi+1 \Mδi = {d
i
j : j < j
∗
i }, so that d
i
0 = aδi and d
i
1 = bδi . We consider
the type Γ, which is the union of
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(a)
Γ0
def
=
{
ϕ(x0j0, . . . , x
0
jn−1
; hη(c¯)) :n < ω & c¯ ⊆ Mδi & j0, . . . jn−1 < j
∗
i &
Mδi+1 |= ϕ(d
i
j0
, . . . , dijn−1; c¯)
}
,
(taking care of one “side” (for η0 or η1) of the part (α) above)
(b) Γ1, defined analogously to Γ0, but with x
0
j0
, . . . , x0jn−1 replaced every-
where by x1j0 , . . . , x
1
jn−1
,
(taking care of the remaining “side” of (α) above, interchanging η0 and η1)
(c) Γ2 = {(x
0
0, x
0
1)I ∩ (x
1
0, x
1
1)I = ∅},
(this says that the above intervals in <0 are disjoint, which after the right choice of hη0 (d
i
j) = a
realisation of x0j or hη0(d
i
j) = a realisation of x
1
j (j < 2), and similarly for hη1 , will take care of
the part (δ) above.)
(d) Γ3 = Γ
0
3 ∪ Γ
1
3, where for l < 2
Γl3 =
{
xlj 6= c : j < j
∗
i , c ∈ ∪{Rang(hρ) : hρ already defined}
}
.
(e)
Γ4 = {x
0
j1
6= x1j2 : j0, j1 < j
∗
i }
((d)+ (e) are taking care of (γ) above, part (i)).
(f)
Γ5 =
{
¬(x0j0Ex
1
j1
) : if j0, j1 < j
∗
i
but there is no a ∈Mδi with [d
i
j0
Ea ∨ dij1Ea]
}
.
(together with Γ6 below, taking care of part (γ)(ii), see below. Note that the type is defined using
∨ rather than ∧, but this will turn out to be sufficient.)
(g) Γ6 = Γ
0
6 ∪ Γ
1
6, where
Γl6 =
{
¬(xljEb) : j < j
∗
i and b is an element of the set
∪ {Rang(hρ) : hρ already defined and ¬(∃c ∈ Nη)[bE c]}
}
.
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First note that requiring Γ5∪Γ6 throughout the construction indeed guaran-
tees that (γ)(ii) can be satisfied. Namely, suppose that the realisations of x0j0
and x1j1 are E-equivalent. Then by Γ5 we must have that for some l < 2 and
a ∈ Mδi we have that d
ijl Ea. By transitivity then the realisation of x
1−l
j1−l
would have to be E-equivalent to hη(a), which might only be precluded by
dij1−l being E equivalent to some c such that a and c are not E-equivalent.
This cannot happen by Γ6.
We conclude that, if Γ is consistent, as C is κ¯-saturated, the functions hηl
can be defined. Namely, for a realisation {clj : j < j
∗
i , l < 2} of Γ, we can
define gl(d
i
j) = c
l
j , and then we let hη0 = g0 if c
0
1 <0 c
1
0, and g1 otherwise. We
let hη1 = g1−l if hη0 = gl. This guarantees that (δ) above is satisfied.
Let us then show that Γ is consistent. Suppose for contradiction that
this is not so, so we can find a finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ which is inconsistent. Let
{j0, . . . , jn−1} be an increasing enumeration of a set including all j < j
∗
i such
that xlj is mentioned in Γ
′ for some l < 2 and let d¯ = 〈dij0, . . . d
i
jn−1
〉. Without
loss of generality, 0 and 1 appear in the list {j0, . . . , jn−1} and hence j0 = 0
while j1 = 1. By closing under conjunctions and increasing Γ
′ (retaining
that Γ′ ⊆ Γ is finite) if necessary, we may assume that for some formula
σ(x0, . . . xn−1; c¯) ∈ tp(d¯/Mδi), we have
Γ′ ∩ Γl = {ϑl(x
l
j0
, . . . xljn−1 ; hη(c¯))}
for l < 2, where ϑl(x
l
j0
, . . . xljn−1 ; hη(c¯)) is the formula obtained from σ by
replacing xk by x
l
jk
and c¯ by hη(c¯).
Let ϑ2 be the formula comprising Γ2 and ϑ
l
3(x¯
l; c¯l3) =
∧
(Γl3 ∩ Γ
′), while
ϑ4 =
∧
(Γ4∩Γ
′) and ϑ5 =
∧
(Γ5∩Γ
′). Let ϑ3 = ϑ
0
3∧ϑ
1
3 and ϑ =
∧
k<6,k 6=2,3 ϑk.
Without loss of generality, ϑ includes statements xl0 6= . . . 6= x
l
n−1 and
xl0 <0 x
l
1 for l < 2. We may also assume that (x
0
0, x
0
1)I ∩ (x
1
0, x
1
1)I = ∅ is
included in Γ′. The choice of n may be assumed to have been such that for
some cl0, . . . c
l
n−1 (for l < 2) from
⋃
{Rang(hρ) : hρ already defined}, we have
Γ′ ∩ Γ3 = {x
l
jm
6= clk : l < 2, k < n,m < n},
and finally that
Γ′ ∩ Γ5 = {¬(x
0
jk
Ex1jm) : k,m < n &
¬(∃a ∈Mδi)[d
i
jk
Ea ∨ dijmEa]}.
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By extending hη to an automorphism hˆη of C, and applying (hˆη)
−1, we may
assume that hη = idMδi . We can also assume that no c
l
k is an element of Mδi ,
as otherwise the relevant inequalities can be absorbed by σ.
We shall use the following general
Fact 1.16 Suppose that N ≺ C and e¯ ∈ mC is disjoint from N , while N ⊆ A.
Then
r(x¯)
def
=tp(e¯, N) ∪ {xk 6= d : d ∈ A \N, k < m}
∪ {¬(xkEd) : d ∈ A & (d/E) ∩N = ∅, k < m},
is consistent (and in fact, every finite subset of it is realised in N).
Proof of the Fact. Otherwise, there is a finite r′(x¯) ⊆ r(x¯) which is
inconsistent. Without loss of generality, r′(x¯) is the union of sets of the
following form (we have a representative type of the sets for each clause)
• {̺(x¯, c¯)} for some c¯ ⊆ N and ̺ such that |= ̺[e¯, c¯].
• {xk 6= cˆ
s
k : k < m} for some cˆ
s
0, . . . cˆ
s
m−1 ∈ A \N and s < s
∗ < ω,
• {¬(xk E dˆ
t
k) : k < m} for some dˆ
t
0, . . . dˆ
t
m−1 ∈ A \ N and t < t
∗ < ω
such that (dˆtk/E) ∩N = ∅.
By the elementarity of N , there is e¯′ ∈ N with N |= ̺[e¯′, c¯]. By the choice of
the rest of the formulae in r¯′(x¯), we see that e¯′ satisfies them as well, which
is a contradiction. ⋆1.16
Let x¯l = (xl0, . . . , x
l
n−1) for l < 2. Let
Φ0
def
= {ϕ(x¯0) : ϕ(x0j0, . . . , x
0
jn−1
) ∈ Γ′ ∩ (Γ0 ∪ Γ
0
3 ∪ Γ
0
6)}.
Applying the last phrase in the above Fact to Φ0(x¯
0), the model Mδi and
d¯, we obtain a sequence e¯0 = (e00, . . . e
0
n−1) ∈ Mδi which realises Φ0(x¯
0). For
k,m such that ¬(x0jkEx
1
jm
) ∈ Γ5 we have ¬(∃a ∈Mδi)(aEd
i
jk
∨ aEdijm). So
¬(xkEe
0
m) ∧ ¬(e
0
mE xm) ∈ tp(d¯/Mδi).
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Let now
Φ1(x¯
1) = {¬(x1k E e
0
m) ∧ ¬(e
0
k E x
1
m) : ¬(x
0
jk
E x1jm) ∈ Γ5}
∪{x1k 6= e
0
m : k,m < n} ∪ {ϕ(x¯
1) : ϕ(x1j0 , . . . , x
1
jn−1
) ∈ Γ′ ∩ (Γ1 ∪ Γ
1
3 ∪ Γ
1
6)}.
Φ1(x¯
1) is a finite set to which we can apply the last phrase of Fact 1.16.
In this way we find e¯1 = (e10, . . . e
1
n−1) ∈ Mδi realising Φ1(x¯
1). Now we
show that e¯0 ⌢ e¯1 realises Γ′ \ Γ2. So suppose ¬(x
0
jk
Ex1jm) ∈ Γ
′ ∩ Γ5, then
¬(x1k E e
0
m) ∈ Φ1, hence ¬(e
1
kEe
0
m). Also ∧k,m<n(e
1
k 6= e
0
m) holds, by the
choice of Φ1, so e¯
0 ⌢ e¯1 realises Γ′ ∩ Γ4. Now we need to deal with Γ2. Let
D
def
= {(u¯0, u¯1) : (u¯0, u¯1) satisfies ϑ}.
So D is first order definable with parameters in Mδi and we have just shown
that D ∩Mδi 6= ∅. Also if e¯
0 ⌢ e¯1 ⊆ Mδi satisfies ϑ, it necessarily realises
Γ′ \ Γ2 (as no c
l
k ∈ Mδi , see the definition). As Γ
′ is presumed to be incon-
sistent, no (u¯0, u¯1) ∈ D ∩Mδi can realise Γ
′, i.e. satisfy ϑ2, and hence for no
(u¯0, u¯1) ∈ D ∩Mδi are the intervals (u
0
0, u
0
1)I and (u
1
0, u
1
1)I disjoint. Now we
claim that if (u¯0, u¯1) ∈Mδi ∩ D, then (u
0
0, u
0
1)I ∩ (aδi , bδi)I 6= ∅.
Indeed, suppose otherwise, say u01 <0 d
i
0 = aδi , so u
0
1 <0 x0 ∈ tp(d¯/Mδi).
Arguing as above, with u¯0 in place of e¯0 and Φ1(x¯) ∪ {u
0
1 <0 x
1
0} in place
of Φ1(x¯
1), we can find u¯ ∈ Mδi satisfying (u
0
1 <0 u0) and such that (u¯
0, u¯)
satisfies ϑ. So (u¯0, u¯) ∈ D ∩Mδi and the intervals (u
0
0, u
0
1)I and (u0, u1)I are
disjoint, a contradiction. A similar contradiction can be derived from the
assumption bδi = d
δi
1 <0 u
0
0. Now note that (u¯
0, u¯1) ∈ D =⇒ (u¯1, u¯0) ∈ D,
so if (u¯0, u¯1) ∈ D ∩Mδi we also have (u
1
0, u
1
1)I ∩ (aδi , bδi)I 6= ∅.
By the choice of C, there is no x ∈Mδi with d
δi
0 ≤0 x ≤0 d
δi
1 , hence
if (u¯0, u¯1) ∈Mδi ∩ D and l < 2, we have u
l
0 <0 d
δi
0 <0 d
δi
1 <0 u
l
1. (∗)
Let σ∗(y¯) be ∃x¯((x¯, y¯) ∈ D). Hence if
̺0(z) = (∃y¯)[σ
∗(y¯) ∧ z ≤0 y0]
and
̺1(z) = (∃y¯)[σ
∗(y¯) ∧ y1 ≤0 z],
then
Mδi |= (∀z0, z1)[̺0(z0) ∧ ̺1(z1) =⇒ z0 <0 z1].
Of course, this holds in C as well, so
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(a) ̺0(z) defines an initial segment of I,
(b) ̺1(z) defines an end segment of I,
(c) the segments defined by ̺0(z) and ̺1(z) are disjoint,
(d) ̺0(Mδi) ∪ ̺1(Mδi) = I ∩Mδi .
[Why? Note that (e¯0, d¯) ∈ D. Hence σ∗(d¯) holds. As for every
a ∈ I ∩Mδi we have a <I aδi or a >I bδi , the conclusions follows.]
(e) ̺0(aδi) and ̺1(bδi) hold.
[Why? Again because σ∗(d¯) holds.]
The above arguments show that {x : (∃y¯)[(σ∗(y¯)∧ x <0 y0)]} defines the
Dedekind cut {x : x <0 aδi} over Mδi , which contradicts the choice of C and
the fact that the Dedekind cut induced by (a¯, b¯) is not definable (which is a
part of the definition of ∗[M, a¯, b¯]).
Stage C. Now we have shown that the trees 〈Nη : η ∈
λ>2〉, 〈hη : η ∈
λ>2〉
of models and embeddings can be defined as required, and we consider
p∗
def
= ∪η∈λ>2hη(p ↾Mδlg(η)).
We shall show that p∗ is finitely satisfiable, hence satisfiable. Let Γ′ ⊆ p∗
be finite. Recalling the analysis of p from Stage A, we consider each of the
cases by which p could have been defined (ignoring Case 1A, as justified by
Subclaim 1.15.)
Case 1. In this case there is a function f : QM → QM respecting E,
with aEf(a) for all a ∈ QM , and without loss of generality there are some
η0, . . . ηm−1 ∈
λ>2 and {bji : j < m, i < nj} ⊆ Rang(f) such that
Γ′ = {P (z)} ∪
⋃
j<m
{hηj (b
j
i )Rz : i < nj},
and for each j we have {bji : i < nj} ⊆Mδlg(ηj). Let n
def
= Σj<mnj , hence Γ
′ is
a quantifier free (partial) type over n variables in C[ψ¯]. By Observation 1.9,
we only need to check that in Γ′ there are no direct contradictions with the
axioms of T+feq.
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The only possibility for such a contradiction is that for some j0, j1 and
bj0i , b
j1
k we have
hηj0 (b
j0
i ) 6= hηj1 (b
j1
k ) ∧ hηj0 (b
j0
i )E hηj1 (b
j1
k )
and hj0(b
j0
i )Rz, hj1(b
j1
k )Rz ∈ Γ
′. In such a case, any c which would realise Γ′
would contradict part (c) of the definition of T+feq. Suppose that b
j0
i , b
j1
k and
η0, η1 are as above. Let ηl
def
= ηjl for l < 2 and let η = η0 ∩ η1. By part (γ)(ii)
in the definition of h¯, there is bˆ ∈ Nη such that hη0(b
j0
i )E bˆ and hη1(b
j1
k )E bˆ.
For some b ∈Mδlg(η) we have
hη0(b) = hη1(b) = hη(b) = bˆ,
so applying the elementarity of the maps, we obtain
bj0i E bE b
j1
k .
On the other hand, by the definition of p∗ we have bj0i Rz ∈ p(z) and
bj1k Rz ∈ p(z). By the the demands on p this implies that b
j0
i = b
j1
k /∈ Mδlg(η)
and f(b) = bj0i , contradicting the fact that Mδlg(η) is closed under f .
Case 2. For a fixed a∗ ∈M0 we have
p(z) = {Q(z)} ∪ {a∗Ez} ∪ {z 6= c : c ∈ a∗/EM},
so without loss of generality
Γ′ = {Q(z)} ∪ {a∗E z} ∪ {z 6= hηj (cj) : j < m}
for some c0, . . . , cm−1 ∈ a
∗/EM and η0, . . . , ηm−1 ∈
λ>2, as h〈〉 = idM0 . As
a∗/E is infinite in any model of T ∗feq, the set Γ
′ is consistent.
Case 3. We may assume that for some equivalence relation E on PM ,
a function f from PM into {yes, no}, sequences η0, . . . ηn−1 ∈
λ>2, and
{aki : i < m, k < n} ⊆ Q
M and {bki , c
k
i , d
k
i : i < m, k < n} ⊆ P
M we
have e1 E e2 =⇒ f(e1) = f(e2) and
Γ′(z) ={Q(z)} ∪
⋃
k<n
{¬(hηk(a
k
i )Ez) : i < m} ∪
⋃
k<n
{(zR hηk(b
k
i ))
f(bki ) : i < m}
∪
⋃
k<n
{[F (z, hηk(c
k
i )) = F (z, hηk(d
k
i ))]
ifcki Ed
k
i : i < m}.
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We could have a contradiction if for some k1, k2, i1, i2 we had f(b
k1
i1
) =yes,
f(bk2i2 ) =no, but hηk1 (b
k1
i1
) = hηk2 (b
k2
i2
), which cannot happen by γ(i) and the
fact that each hη is 1-1. Another possibility is that for some b
k1
i1
, bk2i2 we have
f(bk1i1 ) = f(b
k2
i2
)=yes, but hηk1 (b
k1
i1
) 6= hηk2 (b
k2
i2
) while hηk1 (b
k1
i1
)E hηk2 (b
k2
i2
). To
see that this cannot happen, we distinguish various possibilities for bk1i1 , b
k2
i2
and use part (γ)(ii) in the choice of h¯.
Yet another possible source of contradiction could come from a similar
consideration involving the last clause in the definition of Γ′(z), which cannot
happen for similar reasons.
Stage D. Now we can conclude, using λ = λ<λ and |T | < λ, that there is
a model N∗ ≺ C of size λ with
⋃
η∈λ>2Nη ⊆ N
∗, such that p∗ is realised in N∗.
For ν ∈ λ2, let hν
def
= ∪i<λhν↾i, and let Nν
def
= Rang(hν), while pν
def
= hν(p).
For such ν, let
qν(x)
def
= {I(x)} ∪ {hν(ai) <0 x <0 hν(bi) : i < λ}.
Hence we have that for ν 6= ρ from λ2, the types qν and qρ are contradictory,
by (δ) above. As ||N∗||+ |L(T )| ≤ λ, there are only ≤ λ definable Dedekind
cuts of <0 over N
∗, and only ≤ λ types qν are realised in N
∗. Hence there is
ν ∈ λ2 (actually 2λ many) such that the Dedekind cut {x : ∨i<λx <0 hν(ai)}
is not definable over N∗ and qν is not realised in N
∗. So N∗ omits qν and
realises pν . We let N = h(N
∗), where h is an automorphism of C extending
h−1ν . ⋆1.13
Theorem 1.17 Assume that λ<λ = λ and 2λ = λ+.
(1) For any λ-relevant (Tord, T
∗
feq) -superior (T, ϕ¯, ψ¯), the theory T has a
model M∗ of cardinality λ+ such that
(i) ϕ¯M
∗
is not λ+-saturated,
(ii) ψ¯M
∗
is λ+-saturated.
(2) We can strengthen the claims in (i) and (ii) to include any interpretations
of a dense linear order and T ∗feq-respectively in M
∗, even with parameters.
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Proof. We prove (1), and (2) is proved similarly. Using the Main Claim
1.13, we can constructM∗ of size λ+, by an ≺-increasing continuous sequence
〈M∗i : i ≤ λ
+〉, with ||M∗i || = λ satisfying ∗[Mi, a¯, b¯] for each i ≤ λ
+, and
letting M∗ = Mλ+ . The Main Claim 1.13 is used in the successor steps. To
assure that M∗ is λ+-saturated for T ∗feq, we use the assumption 2
λ = λ+, to
do the bookkeeping of all T ∗feq-types involved. ⋆1.17
Conclusion 1.18 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1.17, the theory T ∗feq
is ⊳∗
λ+
strictly below the theory of a dense linear order with no first or last
elements.
[Why? It is below by Shelah’s Theorem 0.4 above.]
We recall that our motivation for studying ⊳∗ is to try to characterise
SOP3 (or SOP2) theories by the ⊳
∗-maximality. As we explained in the
Introduction this has origins in the connection between the maximality in
the Keisler order and having the strict order property, so we should show
here what is the connection between the maximality in Keisler’s order and
the maximality in the order ⊳∗. The following Claim 1.19 does that for
countable theories.
Claim 1.19 Suppose that T is a countable theory that is ⊳∗λ∗-maximal.
Then it is maximal in the Keisler order ⋖λ.
Proof of the Claim. Suppose otherwise and let T1 be a theory that is
⊳∗-maximal but not maximal in the Keisler order ⋖λ. In particular we
have Tord ⊳
∗
λ T1, so there is a λ-relevant (Tord, T1)-superior triple (T, ϕ¯0, ϕ¯1)-
exemplifying this. By Observation 1.4(0) we may assume that the interpre-
tation ϕ¯1 is trivial, so T1 ⊆ T - for simplicity.
Since T is not maximal in the Keisler order ⋖λ, by [Sh c] 4.2 (1) there
is a regular ultrafilter D which is not good and a model M of T such that
Mλ/D is nevertheless λ+-compact. We can extend M to a model N of T
and consider N∗ = Nλ/D. This is a model of T and by the Extension
Theorem for ultrafilters we have that [N∗]ϕ¯1 = Mλ/D, so it is λ+-compact
and hence it is λ+-saturated. Again by the Extension Theorem we have that
[N∗]ϕ¯1 = (N ϕ¯1)λ/D. Now on the one hand we have by the ⊳∗λ∗-maximality of
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T1 that (N
ϕ¯1)λ/Dmust be λ+-saturated, hence λ+-compact. But on the other
hand (N ϕ¯1)λ/D cannot be λ+-compact because D is not a good ultrafilter
and Tord is maximal in the Keisler order, contradicting [Sh c] 4.2 (1). ⋆1.19
2 On the properties SOP2 and SOP1
In his paper [Sh 500], S. Shelah investigated a hierarchy of properties un-
stable theories without strong order property may have. This hierarchy is
named NSOPn for 3 ≤ n < ω, where the acronym NSOP stands for “not
strong order property”. The negation of NSOPn is denoted by SOPn. It was
shown in [Sh 500] that SOPn+1 =⇒ SOPn, that the implication is strict
and that SOP3 theories are not simple. In this section we investigate two
further notions, which with the intention of furthering the above hierarchy,
we name SOP2 and SOP1. The original definitions of SOPn for n ≥ 3 do not
immediately lend themselves to extending the hierarchy for n = 1, 2, but the
properties we define nevertheless fulfill that role. In section 3, a connection
between this hierarchy and ⊳∗λ-maximality will be established.
Recall from [Sh 500] one of the equivalent definitions of SOP3. (The
equivalence is established in Claim 2.19 of [Sh 500]).
Definition 2.1 (1) A (complete) theory T has SOP3 iff there is an indis-
cernible sequence 〈a¯i : i < ω〉 and formulae ϕ(x¯, y¯), ψ(x¯, y¯) such that
(a) {ϕ(x¯, y¯), ψ(x¯, y¯)} is contradictory,
(b) for some sequence 〈b¯j : j < ω〉 we have
i ≤ j =⇒ |= ϕ[b¯j , a¯i] and i > j =⇒ |= ψ[b¯j , a¯i],
(c) for i < j, the set {ϕ(x¯, a¯j), ψ(x¯, a¯i)} is contradictory.
(2) NSOP3 stands for the negation of SOP3.
Definition 2.2 (1) T has SOP2 if there is a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) which exempli-
fies this property in C = CT , which means:
There are a¯η ∈ C for η ∈
ω>2 such that
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(a) for every ρ ∈ ω2, the set {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ↾n) : n < ω} is consistent,
(b) if η, ν ∈ ω>2 are incomparable, {ϕ(x¯, a¯η), ϕ(x¯, a¯ν)} is inconsistent.
(2) T has SOP1 if there is a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯) which exemplifies this in C, which
means:
There are a¯η ∈ C, for η ∈
ω>2 such that:
(a) for ρ ∈ ω2 the set {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ↾n) : n < ω} is consistent.
(b) if ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η ∈ ω>2, then {ϕ(x¯, a¯η), ϕ(x¯, a¯ν⌢〈1〉)} is inconsistent.
(3) NSOP2 and NSOP1 are the negations of SOP2 and SOP1 respectively.
The following Claim establishes the relative position of the properties
introduced in Definition 2.2 within the (N)SOP hierarchy.
Claim 2.3 For any complete first order theory T , we have
SOP3 =⇒ SOP2 =⇒ SOP1.
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that T is SOP3, as exemplified by 〈a¯i : i < ω〉,
〈b¯j : j < ω〉 and formulae ϕ(x¯, y¯) and ψ(x¯, y¯) (see Definition 2.1), and we
shall show that T satisfies SOP2. We define
ϑ(x¯, y¯0 ⌢ y¯1) ≡ ϕ(x¯, y¯0) ∧ ψ(x¯, y¯1), where lg(y¯0) = lg(y¯1).
Let us first prove the consistency of
Γ
def
=
T ∪ {¬(∃x¯)[ϑ(x¯, y¯η) ∧ ϑ(x¯, y¯ν)] : η ⊥ ν in
ω>2}∪
∪
⋃
n<ω
{(∃x¯)[
∧
k≤n
ϑ(x¯, y¯η↾k)] : η ∈
n2}.
Suppose for contradiction that Γ is not consistent, then for some n < ω, the
following set is inconsistent:
Γ′
def
=
T ∪ {¬(∃x¯)[ϑ(x¯, y¯η) ∧ ϑ(x¯, y¯ν)] : η, ν incomparable in
n≥2}
∪ {(∃x¯)[
∧
k≤n
ϑ(x¯, y¯η↾k)] : η ∈
n2}.
Fix such n. We pick ordinals αη, βη < ω for η ∈
n≥2 so that
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(i) ν ⊳ η =⇒ αν < αη < αη + 1 < βη < βν ,
(ii) βη⌢〈0〉 < αη⌢ 〈1〉.
For η ∈ n≥2 let a¯∗η
def
= a¯αη ⌢ a¯βη . We show that C and {a¯
∗
η : η ∈
n≥2} ex-
emplify that Γ′ is consistent. So, if η ∈ n≥2 then we have
∧
k≤n ϑ[b¯αη+1, a¯
∗
η↾k]
as for every k ≤ n we have αη↾k < αη + 1, so ϕ[b¯αη+1, a¯αη↾k ] holds, but
also for all k ≤ n, as η ↾ k E η, we have βη↾k > αη + 1, so ψ[b¯αη+1, a¯βη↾k ]
holds. Hence (∃x¯)[
∧
k≤n ϑ(x¯, a¯
∗
η↾k)]. On the other hand, if ν ⌢ 〈l〉 E ηl for
l < 2, then {ϑ(x¯, a¯∗η0), ϑ(x¯, a¯
∗
η1
)} is contradictory as the conjunction implies
ψ(x¯, a¯βη0 )∧ϕ(x¯, a¯αη1 ), which is contradictory by βη0 < αη1 and (c) of Defini-
tion 2.1. This shows that Γ′ is consistent, hence we have also shown that Γ
is consistent.
Having shown that Γ is consistent, we can find witnesses {a¯∗η : η ∈
ω>2}
in C realising Γ. Now we just need to show that {ϑ(x¯, a¯∗η↾n) : n < ω} is
consistent for every η ∈ ω2. This follows by the compactness theorem and
the definition of Γ. Hence we have shown that SOP3 =⇒ SOP2.
The second part of the claim is obvious (and the witnesses for SOP2 can
be used for SOP1 as well). ⋆2.3
Question 2.4 Are the implications from Claim 2.3 reversible?
Claim 2.5 If T satisfies SOP1, then T is not simple. In fact, if ϕ(x¯, y¯)
exemplifies SOP1 of T , then the same formula exemplifies that T has the
tree property.
Proof of the Claim. Let ϕ(x¯, y¯) and {a¯η : η ∈
ω>2} exemplify SOP1.
Then
Γη
def
= {ϕ(x¯, a¯η⌢〈0〉n⌢〈1〉) : n < ω}
for η ∈ ω>2 consists of pairwise contradictory formulae. (Here 〈0〉n denotes
a sequence consisting of n zeroes.) For n < ω and ν ∈ nω let
ρν
def
= 〈0〉ν(0)+1 ⌢ 〈1〉⌢ 〈0〉ν(1)+1 . . . ⌢ 〈0〉ν(n−1)+1 ⌢ 〈1〉,
so ρν ∈
ω>2 and ν E η =⇒ ρν E ρη. For ν ∈
nω let b¯ν = a¯ρν . We observe
first that {ϕ(x¯, b¯ν 〈ˆk〉) : k < ω} is a set of pairwise contradictory formulae,
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for ν ∈ nω; namely, if k0 6= k1, then ϕ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈kl〉) for l < 2 are two different
elements of Γρν . On the other hand, {ϕ(x¯, b¯ν↾n) : n < ω} is consistent for
every ν ∈ ωω. Hence ϕ(x¯, y¯) and {b¯ν : ν ∈
ω>ω} exemplify that T has the
tree property, and so T is not simple. ⋆2.5
This ends the discussion of the properties of SOP1 and SOP2 that are
directly relevant to the main thesis of the paper-the reader only interested
in the connection with the order ⊳∗ can now turn directly to §3. The rest of
this section however contains some further syntactic developments of these
properties which are of interest if one wishes to understand the type theory
induced by them. The indescernibility results we have here were recently
used by Shelah and Usvyatsov [ShUs 844] to define a rank function on NSOP1
theories (see Theorem 2.22)).
The definition of when a theory has SOP1 can be made in another equiv-
alent fashion.
Definition 2.6 Let ϕ(x¯, y¯) be a formula of L(T ). We say ϕ(x¯, y¯) has SOP′1
iff there is 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 in CT such that
(a) {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ↾n)
ρ(n) : n < ω} is consistent for every ρ ∈ ω2, where we use the
notation
ϕl =
{
ϕ if l = 1,
¬ϕ if l = 0
for l < 2.
(b) If ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η ∈ ω>2, then {ϕ(x¯, a¯η), ϕ(x¯, a¯ν)} is inconsistent.
We say that T has property SOP′1 iff some formula of L(T ) has it.
Claim 2.7 (1) If ϕ(x¯, y¯) exemplifies SOP1 of T then ϕ(x¯, y¯) (hence T ) has
property SOP′1.
(2) If T has property SOP′1 then T has SOP1.
Proof of the Claim. (1) Let {a¯η : η ∈
ω>2} and ϕ(x¯, y¯) exemplify that T
has SOP1. For η ∈
ω>2 we define b¯η
def
= a¯η⌢〈1〉. We shall show that ϕ(x¯, y¯)
and {b¯η : η ∈
ω>2} exemplify SOP′1.
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Given ηˆ ∈ ω2. Let c¯ exemplify that item (a) from Definition 2.2(2)
holds for ηˆ. Given n < ω, we consider ϕ[c¯, b¯ηˆ↾n]
ηˆ(n). If ηˆ(n) = 1, then,
as b¯ηˆ↾n = a¯ηˆ↾n⌢〈1〉 = a¯ηˆ↾(n+1), we have that ϕ[c¯, b¯ηˆ↾n]
ηˆ(n) = ϕ[c¯, a¯ηˆ↾(n+1)] holds.
If ηˆ(n) = 0, then
(ηˆ ↾ n) ⌢ 〈0〉 = ηˆ ↾ (n + 1).
As ϕ[c¯, a¯ηˆ↾(n+1)] holds, by (b) of Definition 2.2(2), we have that ϕ[c¯, a¯ηˆ↾n⌢〈1〉]
cannot hold, showing again that, ϕ[c¯, b¯ηˆ↾n]
ηˆ(n) = ¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ηˆ↾n⌢〈1〉] holds. This
shows that {ϕ(x¯, b¯ηˆ↾n)
ηˆ(n) : n < ω} is consistent, as exemplified by c¯.
Suppose ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η ∈ ω>2 and that ϕ[d¯, b¯η] ∧ ϕ[d¯, b¯ν ] holds. So both
ϕ[d¯, a¯η⌢〈1〉] and ϕ[d¯, a¯ν⌢〈1〉] hold. On the other hand, as ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η,
clearly ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η ⌢ 〈1〉, and so (b) of Definition 2.2(2) implies that
{ϕ(x¯, a¯η⌢〈1〉), ϕ(x¯, a¯ν⌢〈1〉)} is contradictory, a contradiction. Hence the set
{ϕ(x¯, b¯η), ϕ(x¯, b¯ν)} is contradictory
(2) Define first for η ∈ ω≥2 an element ρη ∈
ω≥2 by letting
ρη(3k) = η(k),
ρη(3k + 1) = 0,
ρη(3k + 2) = 1,
and if lg(η) = m < ω, then lg(ρη) = 3m. Note that for η ∈
ω2 and k < ω we
have ρη↾k = ρη ↾ (3k).
Let ϕ(x¯, y¯) and {a¯η : η ∈
ω>2} exemplify property SOP′1. We pick c0 6= c1
and define for η ∈ ω>2
b¯η⌢〈1〉
def
= a¯ρη ⌢ a¯ρη⌢〈1〉 ⌢ 〈c0, c1〉,
b¯η⌢〈0〉
def
= a¯ρη⌢〈0,0〉 ⌢ a¯ρη ⌢ 〈c0, c1〉,
b¯〈〉
def
= 〈c0〉2n+2,
where 〈c〉k stands for the sequence of k entries, each of which is c, and
n = lg(y¯) in ϕ(x¯, y¯). We define
ψ(x¯, z¯) ≡ ψ(x¯, z¯0 ⌢ z¯1 ⌢ w0 ⌢ w1) ≡
[w0 = w1] ∨ [ϕ(x¯, z¯0) ∧ ¬ϕ(x¯, z¯1)],
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where z¯ = z¯0 ⌢ z¯1 ⌢ 〈w0, w1〉 and lg(z¯0) = lg(z¯1) = lg(y¯). We now claim
that ψ(x¯, z¯) and {b¯η : η ∈
ω>2} exemplify that SOP1 holds for T . Before we
start checking this, note that for η ∈ ω>2 we have:
•1 ψ(d¯, b¯〈〉) holds for any d¯,
•2 ψ(d¯, b¯η⌢〈0〉) holds iff ϕ(d¯, a¯ρη⌢〈0,0〉) ∧ ¬ϕ(d¯, a¯ρη) holds,
•3 ψ(d¯, b¯η⌢〈1〉) holds iff ¬ϕ(d¯, a¯ρη⌢〈1〉) ∧ ϕ(d¯, a¯ρη) holds.
Let us verify 2.2(2)(a), so let η ∈ ω2. Pick c¯ such that ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾n]
ρη(n) holds
for all n < ω. We claim that
ψ[c¯, b¯η↾n] holds for all n. (∗)
The proof is by a case analysis of n.
If n = 0, this is trivially true. If n = k + 1 and η(k) = 0, then we need to
verify that ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k⌢〈0,0〉] holds and ¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k ] holds. We have
ρη↾k ⌢ 〈0, 0〉 = ρη ↾ (3k + 2),
and ρη(3k + 2) = 1. Hence ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k⌢〈0,0〉] holds by the choice of c¯. On
the other hand, we have ρη↾k = ρη ↾ (3k), and ρη(3k) = η(k) = 0, hence
¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k ] holds.
If n = k + 1 and η(k) = 1, then we need to verify that ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k ] holds
while ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾(3k)⌢〈1〉] does not. As ρη↾k = ρη ↾ (3k), and ρη(3k) = η(k) = 1,
we have that ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k] holds. Note that ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾(3k+2)] holds as ρη(3k+2) = 1.
We also have (ρη ↾ (3k + 1)) ⌢ 〈0〉 E ρη ↾ (3k + 2). Hence ¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾(3k+1)]
by part (b) in Definition 2.6. But
¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾(3k+1)] ≡ ¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾(3k)⌢〈1〉] ≡ ¬ϕ[c¯, a¯ρη↾k⌢〈1〉]
holds, so we are done proving (∗).
Let us now verify 2.2(2)(b). So suppose ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η and consider
{ψ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈1〉), ψ(x¯, b¯η)}. Let σ and l be such that η = σ ⌢ 〈l〉.
Case 1. ν = σ.
Hence l = 0. So ψ(x¯, b¯η) =⇒ ¬ϕ(x¯, a¯ρν) and ψ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈1〉) =⇒ ϕ(x¯, a¯ρν ),
by •2 and •3 respectively, showing that {ψ(x¯, b¯η), ψ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈1〉)} is inconsistent.
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Case 2. ν ⊳ σ and l = 0.
Hence ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E σ. Clearly ρν ⌢ 〈0〉 E ρσ ⌢ 〈0, 0〉, as
ρσ(lg(ρν)) = σ(lg(ν)) = 0.
We have ψ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈1〉) =⇒ ϕ(x¯, a¯ρν ) by •3 and ψ(x¯, b¯η) = ψ(x¯, b¯σ ⌢ 〈0〉)
implies ϕ(x¯, a¯ρσ⌢〈0,0〉) by •2, while the two formulae being implied are con-
tradictory, by (b) in the definition of SOP′1.
Case 3. ν ⊳ σ and l = 1.
Observe that ψ(x¯, b¯η) =⇒ ϕ(x¯, a¯ρσ) by •3 and ψ(x¯, b¯ν⌢〈1〉) =⇒ ϕ(x¯, a¯ρν).
As above, using ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E σ, we show that the set {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρν ), ϕ(x¯, a¯ρσ)} is
inconsistent. ⋆2.7
Conclusion 2.8 T has SOP1 iff T has property SOP
′
1 from Claim 2.7.
Question 2.9 Is the conclusion of 2.8 true when the theory T is replaced
by a formula ϕ?
Start changes
It turns out that witnesses to being SOP1 can be chosen to be highly
indiscernible.
Definition 2.10 (1) Given an ordinal α and sequences η¯l = 〈η
l
0, η
l
1, . . . , η
l
nl
〉
for l = 0, 1 of members of α>2, we say that η¯0 ≈1 η¯1 iff
(a) n0 = n1,
(b) the truth values of
• ηlk = 〈〉,
• ηlk1 ∩ η
l
k2
E ηlk3 ∩ η
l
k4
do not depend on l,
(c) ηlk1 5 η
l
k2
=⇒ η0k1(lg(η
0
k1
∩ η0k2)) = η
1
k1
(lg(η1k1 ∩ η
1
k2
))
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for k1, k2, k3, k4 ≤ n0.
(2) We say that the sequence 〈a¯η : η ∈
α>2〉 of elements of C (for an ordinal α)
is 1-fully binary tree indiscernible (1-fbti) iff whenever η¯0 ≈1 η¯1 are sequences
of elements of α>2, then
a¯η¯0
def
= a¯η00 ⌢ . . . ⌢ a¯η0n0
and the similarly defined a¯η¯1 , realise the same type in C.
(3) Suppose that δ is a limit ordinal > 0. Define h∗ = h∗δ :
δ>2 → δ>2 by
letting for η ∈ δ>2
• lg(h∗(η)) = 2lg(η) + 1,
• i < lg(h∗(η)) =⇒ h∗(η)(2i) = 0, h∗(η)(2i+ 1) = η(i),
• h∗(η)(2lg(η)) = 1.
For n < ω and η¯ ∈ n(δ>2) we define h∗(η¯) = 〈h∗(ηl) : l < n〉.
We say η¯ ≈2 ν¯ iff h∗(η¯) ≈1 h∗(ν¯). We define 2-fbti like 1-fbti but using
≈2 in place of ≈1.
Observation 2.10 A The following can be easily checked:
(1) Let η¯, ν¯ ∈ n(α>2) and let η¯′ and ν¯ ′ be the closures of η¯, ν¯, respectively,
under intersections. Then η¯ ≈1 ν¯ iff η¯′ ≈1 ν¯ ′.
(2) If 〈a¯η¯ : η ∈
δ>2〉 is 1-fbti then 〈a¯h∗(η¯) : η ∈
δ>2〉 is 2-fbti.
(3) h∗(η) is never 〈, 〉 and h∗(η0) is never a strict initial segment of h
∗(η1).
Claim 2.11 If t ∈ {1, 2} and 〈b¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 are of given constant length,
and δ ≥ ω is a (limit for t = 2) ordinal, then we can find 〈a¯η : η ∈
δ>2〉 such
that
(a) 〈a¯η : η ∈
δ>2〉 is t-fbti,
(b) if η¯ = 〈ηm : m < n〉, where each ηm ∈
δ>2, is given, then we can find
νm ∈
ω>2 (m < n) such that with ν¯
def
= 〈νm : m < n〉, we have ν¯ ≈t η¯
and sequences a¯η¯ and b¯ν¯ realise the same type in C.
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Proof of the Claim.2 Let us first deal with t = 1. By Observation 2.10 A
(1) above, we may reduce to checking clause (b) only for tuples b¯η where η
is closed under intersections. By Compactness Theorem it suffices to assume
δ = ω. The proof goes through a series of steps through which we obtain in-
creasing degrees of indiscernibility. We shall need some auxiliary definitions.
Let α be an infinite ordinal.
Definition 2.12 (1) Given η¯ = 〈η0, . . . , ηk−1〉, a sequence of elements of
α>2,
and an ordinal γ. We define η¯′ = clγ(η¯) as follows:
η¯′ = 〈〈〉, η0, η0 ↾ γ, η1, η1 ↾ γ, η0 ∩ η1, η2, η2 ↾ γ, η0 ∩ η2, η1 ∩ η2 . . .〉.
We also define uγ[η¯] = {ηl ∈ η¯ : lg(ηl) > γ}.
(2) We say that η¯ ≈γ,n ν¯ iff η¯′
def
= clγ(η¯) and ν¯
′ def= clγ(ν¯) satisfy
(i) η¯′ = 〈η′l : l < m〉 and ν¯
′ = 〈ν ′l : l < m〉 are both in
m(α>2) for some m,
(ii) for l < m we have η′l ∈
γ≥2 ⇐⇒ ν ′l ∈
γ≥2, and for such l we have
η′l = ν
′
l ,
(iii) n ≥ |uγ[η¯]|,
(iv) η′l, η
′
k ∈ uγ[η¯] =⇒ [lg(η
′
l) < lg(η
′
k) ⇐⇒ lg(ν
′
l) < lg(ν
′
k)],
(v) η′l1 E η
′
l2
⇐⇒ ν ′l1 E ν
′
l2
, and the same holds for the equality,
(vi) if η′l1 is not an initial segment of η
′
l2
, then η′l1(lg(η
′
l1
∩η′l2)) = ν
′
l1
(lg(ν ′l1∩ν
′
l2
)).
(3) 〈a¯η : η ∈
α>2〉 is (γ, n)-indiscernible iff for every k, for every η¯, ν¯ ∈ k(α>2)
with η¯ ≈γ,n ν¯, the tuples a¯η¯ and a¯ν¯ realise the same type.
(4) (≤ γ, n)-indiscernibility is the conjunction of (β, n)-indiscernibility for all
β ≤ γ.
(5) We say that 〈a¯η : η ∈
α>2〉 is 0-fbti iff it is (γ, n)-indiscernible for all γ
and n.
2Note that the definition of ≈1,≈2 has changed from the one given in the published
version of this paper, but the following proof is basically the same as the one there.
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Note 2.12 A (1) cl0(η¯) is simply the closure of η¯ under intersections,
joined with 〈〉 in appropriate places.
(2) η¯ ≈γ,n ν¯ iff clγ(η¯) ≈γ,n clγ(ν¯).
Subclaim 2.13 If a¯η ∈
k
C for η ∈ ω>2 are tuples of constant length and
closed under intersections, then
for any α ≥ ω we can find a¯′ = 〈a¯′η : η ∈
α>2〉 such that
(x) a¯′ is 0-fbti,
(xx) for every m and a finite set ∆ of formulae, we can find h : m≥2→ ω>2
such that
(α) 〈a¯′η : η ∈
m≥2〉 and 〈a¯h(η) : η ∈
m≥2〉 realise the same ∆-type,
(β) h satisfies h(η)ˆ 〈l〉 E h(η 〈ˆl〉) for η ∈ m>2 and l < 2, and
lg(η1) = lg(η2) =⇒ lg(h(η1)) = lg(h(η2)).
Proof of the Subclaim. By Compactness Theorem it suffices to work with
α = ω.
Let (∗)γ,n be the conjunction of the statement (x)γ,n given by
a¯′ is (≤ γ, n)-indiscernible,
and (xx) above. We prove by induction on n and then γ that for any γ ≤ ω
we can find a¯′ for which (∗)γ,n holds.
n = 0. We use a¯′η = a¯η.
n+ 1. By induction on γ ≤ ω, we prove that there is a¯′ for which
(∗)γ,n+1 + (∗)ω,n + (xx) holds.
γ < ω.
Without loss of generality, the sequence 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 is (≤ ω, n)-indiscernible,
as (xx) as a relation between 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 and 〈a¯′η : η ∈
ω>2〉 is transitive.
Suppose we are given η¯∗, ν¯∗ satisfying η¯∗ ≈γ,n+1 ν¯∗. By Note 2.1.2 A, we may
assume η¯∗, ν¯∗ to be the same as their clγ closures and the same will hold for
any η¯, ν¯ that we mention in this context.
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If |uγ[η¯∗]| ≤ n, the conclusion follows by the assumptions. We shall as-
sume |uγ[η¯∗]| > n, so |uγ[η¯∗]| = n+1. Moreover, if min(uγ[η¯∗]) = min(uγ[ν¯∗])
and for any l with lg(η∗l ) = min(uγ[η¯
∗]) we have η∗l = ν
∗
l , then using
(x)min(uγ [η¯∗]),n, we get that a¯η¯∗ and a¯ν¯∗ realise the same type. By the same ar-
gument, fixing a finite set ∆ of formulae, for every η¯, we get that the tp∆(a¯η¯)
depends just on the
η¯/ ≈γ,n+1
def
= Υ and {ηl : l < lg(η¯)} ∩
min(uγ [η¯])2 = {ηl : l ∈ v
Υ}
for some vΥ ⊆ lg(η¯). Let us define F 0Υ,∆ by F
0
Υ,∆(〈ηl : l ∈ v
Υ〉) = tp∆(a¯η¯).
By the closure properties of η¯ and the definition of ≈γ,n+1, we get that for
l1 6= l2 ∈ v
Υ the truth value of ηl1 ↾ (γ + 1) = ηl2 ↾ (γ + 1) depends only on
Υ. We can hence replace vΥ by a set vΥ∗ ⊆ v
Υ such that 〈ηl : l ∈ v
Υ
∗ 〉 are the
representatives under the equality of the restrictions to γ + 1.
As we have fixed ∆, there is a finite set A of Υs that can be used as
representatives for the values of F 0Υ,∆. Let r be the size of the range of F
0
Υ,∆.
Let k∗ = 2γ+1 (so finite) and let {µ∗k : k < k
∗} list γ+12. We define a function
FΥ,∆ on
k∗(ω>2) by letting
FΥ,∆(x0, . . . , xk, . . .)k<k∗
def
=F 0Υ,∆(〈ηl : l ∈ v
Υ
∗ 〉),
where ηl ↾ (γ + 1) = µ
∗
k =⇒ ηl = µ
∗
k ⌢ xk.
Define a function F with arity k∗ so that F ((. . . , xk, . . .)k<k∗) is defined iff
for some m < ω we have {xk : k < k
∗} ⊆ m2 and then
F ((. . . , xk, . . .)k<k∗) = 〈FΥ,∆((. . . , xk, . . .)k<k∗) : Υ ∈ A〉.
Therefore F is a function from
⋃
m<ω
∏
k<k∗ levm(
ω>2) into a set of size r.
We recall the following definition and restatement of the Halpern-Lauchli
theorem [HaLa], due to Laver and Pincus and presented in [PiHa].
Definition 2.13 A (1) A tree S is strongly embedded in a tree T if there
is a strictly increasing embedding f ∗ of S as a suborder of T such that
• any nonmaximal node in f(S) has the same number of immediate suc-
cessors in T and in f(S), and
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• all nodes on any common level of S are mapped by f to a common
level of T .
(2) A nonempty subtree of ω>ω is well-behaved if it is finitely branching
and has no maximal nodes (hence it has ω levels).
Halpern-Lauchli theorem Let r, d < ω. Suppose that 〈Ti : i < d〉
are well-behaved trees and that c is a colouring of
⋃
n<ω
∏
i<d levn(Ti) into r
colours. Then there are f ∗, 〈Si : i < d〉 and 〈hi : i < d〉 such that
• f ∗ : ω → ω is a strictly increasing function,
• each Si is a well-behaved tree,
• hi is a strong embedding of Si → Ti,
• for each n < ω and i < d, the common height in Ti of elements of
hi“levn(Si) is f
∗(n), and
•
⋃
n∈u
∏
i<d hi“levn(Si) is c-monochromatic.
Moreover, in the case that all Ti are the same tree, we can assume that all
hi are contained in a common function h.
Therefore we can apply the Halpern-Lauchli theorem to F . We get a
sequence 〈Sk : k < k
∗〉 of well-behaved trees exemplify the conclusion of
the Halpern-Lauchli theorem with hk = h ↾ Sk and f
∗(n) = ht[h“levn(Sk)].
Since the only well-behaved subtree of ω>2 is ω>2 itself, we can conclude that
there is h : ω>2→ ω>2 such that
• h ↾ γ≥2 is the identity,
• lg(h(η)) depends just on lg(η) (not on η),
• h(η)⌢ 〈l〉 ⊳ h(η ⌢ 〈l〉) for l = 0, 1,
• for some c we have that for all m < ω
{ηk : k < k
∗} ⊆ m2 =⇒ F ((h(η0), h(η1), . . . , h(ηk), . . .)k<k∗) = c.
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Let a¯′η for η ∈
ω>2 be defined to be a¯η if η ∈
γ>2, and otherwise a¯h(ν) for the
unique ν such that η ↾ (γ + 1) = µ∗k and η = µ
∗
k ⌢ ν.
We have obtained the desired conclusion, but localized to ∆. The induc-
tion step ends by an application of the compactness theorem.
γ = ω This is vacuously true.
Having carried the induction, the conclusion of the Subclaim follows from∧
n(∗)0,n. ⋆2.13
Now we go back to the proof of the Claim. Given 〈b¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 as in the
assumptions, by the Subclaim we can assume that they are 0-fbti. We choose
by induction on n a function hn :
n≥2 → ω>2 as follows. Let h0(〈〉) = 〈〉. If
hn is defined, let
kn
def
= max{lg(hn(η)) + 1 : η ∈
n≥2}
and let
hn+1(〈〉) = 〈〉, hn+1(〈1〉ˆ ν) = 〈1〉ˆ hn(ν), hn+1(〈0〉ˆ ν) = 〈0, . . . , 0〉ˆhn(ν),
where the sequence of 0s in the last part of the definition has length kn. The
point of the definition of hn is that if η¯
l = 〈ηl0, . . . , η
l
nl
〉 for l = 0, 1 are given
and n∗ = lg(cl0(η¯
0)), then
η¯0 ≈1 η¯
1 =⇒ 〈hn∗(η
0
0), . . . , hn∗(η
0
n0
)〉 ≈0,n∗ 〈hn∗(η
1
0), . . . , hn∗(η
1
n1
)〉.
To check this, we verify the six relevant items of the definition of ≈0,n∗ .
(i) Follows because n0 = n1 by the definition of ≈1.
(ii) If hn∗(η
0
i )∩hn∗(η
0
j ) = 〈〉 then η
0
i ∩η
0
j = 〈〉 so η
1
i ∩η
1
j = 〈〉 by the definition
of ≈1, and hence hn∗(η1i )∩hn∗(η
1
j ) = 〈〉. The opposite implication holds
by symmetry.
(iii) Follows by the definition of n∗.
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(iv) Suppose
0 < lg(hn∗(η
0
i ) ∩ hn∗(η
0
j )) < lg(hn∗(η
0
k) ∩ hn∗(η
0
s)).
Let m ≤ n∗ be the first such that
0 < lg(hn∗(η
0
i ↾ m) ∩ hn∗(η
0
j ↾ m)) < lg(hn∗(η
0
k ↾ m) ∩ hn∗(η
0
s ↾ m)).
Clearly, m > 0. To simplify the notation, let us assume that m = n∗.
Let η0t = 〈lt〉 ⌢ ν
0
t for t ∈ {i, j, k, s} and for some lt ∈ {0, 1} depend-
ing on t. The situation we describe can happen iff li = lj = 1 and
lk = ls = 0, by the definition of hn. By the definition of ≈1 this can be
recognised by the ≈1-type of η¯0.
(v), (vi) Follow because the corresponding properties are preserved by hn.
Fix an n < ω and define a¯η = b¯hn(η) for η ∈
n≥2. By the above argument
it follows that 〈a¯η : η ∈
n≥2〉 are 1-fbti. As n was arbitrary, we can finish by
compactness.
For t = 2, we use exactly the same proof. ⋆2.11
The following Theorem 2.15 will finally tell us that witnesses for SOP1
can be chosen with a certain degree of indiscernability. We need to introduce
a new notion of indiscernability:
Definition 2.14 (1) Given an ordinal α and sequences η¯l = 〈η
l
0, η
l
1, . . . , η
l
nl
〉
for l = 0, 1 of members of α>2, we say that η¯0 ≈3 η¯1 iff
(a) n0 = n1,
(b) the truth values of
• ηlk = 〈〉,
• ηlk1 ∩ η
l
k2
E ηlk3 ∩ η
l
k4
do not depend on l,
(c) ηlk1 5 η
l
k2
=⇒ η0k1(lg(η
0
k1
∩ η0k2)) = η
1
k1
(lg(η1k1 ∩ η
1
k2
)),
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(d) ηlk1 5 η
l
k2
=⇒ η0k1 = (η
0
k1
∩ η0k2)⌢ 〈1〉 iff η
1
k1
= (η1k1 ∩ η
1
k2
) ⌢ 〈1〉.
for k1, k2, k3, k4 ≤ n0.
(2) We say that the sequence 〈a¯η : η ∈
α>2〉 of elements of C (for an ordinal α)
is 3-fully binary tree indiscernible (3-fbti) iff whenever η¯0 ≈1 η¯1 are sequences
of elements of α>2, then
a¯η¯0
def
= a¯η00 ⌢ . . . ⌢ a¯η0n0
and the similarly defined a¯η¯1 , realise the same type in C.
Theorem 2.15 Suppose that T has SOP1 as witnessed by ϕ(x¯, y¯) and a
sequence a¯ = 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉. Then there is d¯ = 〈d¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 exemplifying
that ϕ(x¯, y¯) has SOP1 and 〈d¯η : η ∈
ω>2 \ {〈〉}〉 is 3-fbti.
Proof. Let k∗ = lg(y¯). First define b¯η for η ∈
ω>2 by b¯η = a¯η⌢〈0〉 ⌢ a¯η⌢〈1〉.
Let for any z¯0, z¯1 of length k
∗ and l ∈ {0, 1}, ψl(x¯, z¯0 ⌢ z¯1) ≡ ϕ(x¯, z¯l).
Now we use Claim 2.11 applied to 〈b¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉. Therefore we can find
c¯ = 〈c¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 such that
(a) c¯ is 1-fbti,
(b) for any finite n and η¯ ∈ n(ω>2) there is ν¯ ∈ n(ω>2) such that ν¯ ≈1 η¯ and
b¯η and c¯ν realise the same type in C.
Let d¯η for η ∈
k∗(ω>2) be defined by induction on the length of η so that
d¯η⌢〈0〉 ⌢ d¯η⌢〈1〉 = c¯η and d¯〈〉 = c¯〈〉. This is possible by the choice of b¯ and c¯.
Claim 2.16 If ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η then ϕ(x¯, d¯η) and ϕ(x¯, d¯ν⌢〈1〉) are incompatible.
Proof of the Claim. Let η = ρ ⌢ 〈l〉 for some l ∈ {0, 1}. Consider
{ψl(x¯, c¯ρ), ψ1(x¯, c¯ν)}, we claim that this set is inconsistent. We know that
ψl(x¯, c¯ρ) ≡ ϕ(x¯, d¯ρ⌢〈l〉) ≡ ϕ(x¯, d¯η), ψ1(x¯, c¯ν) ≡ ϕ(x¯, d¯ν⌢〈1〉).
By the 1-fbti property of c¯ and the choice of c¯ with respect to b¯ it suf-
fices to check that {ψl(x¯, b¯ρ), ψ1(x¯, b¯ν)} is inconsistent. This means that
{ϕ(x¯, a¯η), ϕ(x¯, a¯ν⌢〈1〉} is inconsistent, which is true by the choice of a¯. ⋆2.16
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Claim 2.17 For any ρ ∈ ω2, {ϕ(x¯, ¯dρ↾n) : n < ω} is consistent.
Proof of the Claim. It suffices to show that for any
〈〉 ⊳ η0 ⊳ η1 ⊳ . . . ηk
the set {ϕ(x¯, d¯ηl+1↾lg(ηl)⌢ηl+1(lg(ηl)) : l > k} ∪ {ϕ(x¯, d¯〈〉)} is consistent. This
means {ψηl+1(lg(ηl))(x¯, c¯ηl+1↾lg(ηl)) : l < k} ∪ {ϕ(x¯, c¯〈〉)} is consistent. By the
choice of b¯ and c¯ this is to say {ψηl+1(lg(ηl))(x¯, b¯ηl+1↾lg(ηl)) : l < k}∪{ϕ(x¯, a¯〈〉)}
or {ϕ(x¯, a¯ηl+1↾lg(ηl)) : l < k}∪{ϕ(x¯, a¯〈〉)} is consistent, but this is true by the
choice of a¯. ⋆2.17
Claim 2.18 〈dη : η ∈
ω2 \ {0}〉 is 3-fbti.
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that η¯0 ≈3 η¯1 and consider d¯η¯0 and d¯η¯1 . For
each ηkl let ν
l
k be such that η
l
k = ν
l
k ⌢ 〈m
l
k〉 for some m
l
k ∈ {0, 1} and let ν¯0, ν¯1
be defined from νlk(l ∈ {0, 1}, k < lg(η¯0)). Then η¯0 ≈3 η¯1 =⇒ ν¯0 ≈3 ν¯1,
hence c¯ν¯0 and c¯ν¯1 realise the same type, which implies that d¯η¯0 and d¯η¯1 do.
⋆2.18
⋆2.15
End changes.
As we mentioned before, it would be really interesting to know if SOP2
and SOP1 are equivalent. A step towards understanding this question is
provided by the next claim which shows that in the case of theories which
are SOP1 and NSOP2, the witnesses to being SOP1 can be chosen to be
particularly nice. note a change here to 3-fbti from the old version
Claim 2.19 Suppose that ϕ(x¯, y¯) satisfies SOP1, but for no n does the for-
mula ϕn(x¯, y¯0, . . . , y¯n−1) ≡ ∧k<nϕ(x¯, y¯k) satisfy SOP2. Then there are wit-
nesses 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 for ϕ(x¯, y¯) satisfying SOP1 which in addition satisfy:
(c) if X ⊆ ω>2, and there are no η, ν ∈ X such that η ⌢ 〈0〉 E ν, then
{ϕ(x¯, a¯η) : η ∈ X} is consistent.
(d) 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 is 3-fbti.
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(In particular, such a formula and witnesses can be found for any theory
satisfying SOP1 and NSOP2.)
Proof of the Claim. We shall be using the following colouring theorem,
for which we could not find a specific reference and so we include a proof of
it.
Lemma 2.20 Suppose cf(κ) = κ and we colour κ>2 by θ < κ colours. Then
there is an embedding h : ω>2 → κ>2 such that h(η)ˆ〈l〉 E h(ηˆ〈l〉) and
Rang(h) is monochromatic.
Proof of the Lemma. Let c be a colouring as in the assumptions and let
{ai : i < θ} list Rang(c). We claim that there is ν
∗ ∈ κ>2 and j < θ such
that for every ν ∈ κ>2 satisfying ν∗ E ν there is ρ ∈ κ>2 with ν E ρ and
c(ρ) = j. For otherwise, we can choose by induction on i ≤ θ a member
ηi ∈
κ>2 with i < j =⇒ ηi E ηj such that for no ρ ∈
κ2 do we have ηi+1 E ρ
and c(ρ) = i, using θ < cf(κ). As θ < κ, we obtain a contradiction.
Having found such ν∗, j we define h(η) for η ∈ n2 by induction on n < ω.
For n = 0 we choose h(〈〉) to satisfy ν∗ E h(〈〉) and c(h(〈〉) = j, which is
possible by the choice of ν∗ and j. For n+ 1, for any η ∈ n+12 we choose for
l = 0, 1 a member h(η ⌢ 〈l〉) of κ>2 which is above h(η)⌢ 〈l〉 and on which
c is j, which again is possible by the choice of ν∗ and j. ⋆2.20
Let ϕ(x¯, y¯) be a SOP1 formula which is not SOP2, and moreover assume
that for no n does the formula ϕn defined as above satisfy SOP2. By Theorem
2.15, we can find witnesses 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 which are 3-fbti. By the compact-
ness theorem, we can assume that we have a 1-fbti sequence 〈a¯η : η ∈
ω1>2〉
with the properties corresponding to (a) and (b) of Definition 2.2(2), namely
(a) for every η ∈ ω12, the set {ϕ(x¯, a¯η↾α) : α < ω1} is consistent,
(b) if ν ⌢ 〈0〉 E η ∈ ω1>2, then {ϕ(x¯, a¯ν⌢〈1〉), ϕ(x¯, a¯η)} is inconsistent.
We shall now attempt to choose νη and wη for η ∈
ω1>2, by induction on
lg(η) = α < ω1 so that:
(i) νη ∈
ω1>2,
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(ii) β < α =⇒ νη↾β ⊳ νη,
(iii) β < α =⇒ νη(lg(νη↾β)) = η(β),
(iv) wη ⊆
ω1>2 is finite and ν ∈ wη =⇒ lg(ν) < lg(νη),
(v) if lg(η) is a limit ordinal > 0, then wη = ∅,
(vi) if η ∈ β2 and l < 2, then wη⌢〈l〉 ⊆ {ρ ∈
ω1>2 : νη ⌢ 〈l〉 E ρ} and
max{lg(ρ) : ρ ∈ wη⌢〈l〉} < lg(νη⌢〈l〉),
(vii) for each η there is ρ∗ = ρ∗η such that
(α) νη ⊳ ρ
∗ ∈ ω12,
(β) |{α < ω1 : ρ
∗(α) = 1}| = ℵ1,
(γ) letting
pη(x¯)
def
= {ϕ(x¯, a¯Υ) : Υ ∈ wη↾γ for some γ ≤ lg(η)},
we have that for all large enough β∗, the set
pη(x¯) ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ∗↾β) : β > β
∗ ∧ ρ∗(β) = 1}
is consistent,
(viii) pη(x¯) ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη⌢〈0〉 ∪ wη⌢〈1〉} is inconsistent.
Before proceeding, we make several remarks about this definition. Firstly,
requirements (vii) and (viii) taken together imply that for each η ∈ ω1>2 we
have that wη⌢〈0〉∪wη⌢〈1〉 6= ∅. Secondly, the definition of wη⌢〈l〉 for l ∈ {0, 1}
implies that
∧l=0,1ρl ∈ wη⌢〈l〉 =⇒ ρ0 ⊥ ρ1.
Thirdly, in (vii), any ρ∗ which satisfies that νη ⊳ ρ
∗ and |{γ : ρ∗(γ) = 1}| = ℵ1
can be chosen as ρ∗η, by indiscernibility.
Now let us assume that a choice as above is possible, and we have made
it. Hence for each η ∈ ω1>2 there is a finite qη ⊆ pη such that
qη(x¯) ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη⌢〈0〉 ∪ wη⌢〈1〉} (∗)
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is inconsistent. Notice that there are q and η∗ ∈ ω12 such that
(∀η1)[η
∗ E η1 ∈
ω1>2 =⇒ (∃η2 ∈
ω1>2)(η1 E η2 ∧ qη2 = q)].
Namely, otherwise, we would have the following: each pη is countable, hence
for every η there is g(η) with η ⊳ g(η) ∈ ω1>2 and
g(η) E η1 =⇒ qη1 * pη.
Let η0
def
= 〈〉, and for n < ω let ηn+1 = g(ηn). Let η
def
= ∪n<ωηn, hence
pη = ∪n<ωpηn (as wη = ∅), and so qη ⊆ pηn for some n, a contradiction.
Having found such q, η∗, by renaming and using Lemma 2.20, we can
assume that η∗
def
= 〈〉 and that for all η ∈ ω2 we have qη = p〈〉 = q (as
η E ν =⇒ pη ⊆ pν). For η ∈
ω>2 let τ¯η list wη. Without loss of generality,
by thinning and renaming, we have that for all η1, η2,
〈νη1〉⌢ τ¯η1⌢〈0〉 ⌢ τ¯η1⌢〈1〉 ≈1 〈νη2〉⌢ τ¯η2⌢〈0〉 ⌢ τ¯η2⌢〈1〉.
Similarly to the proof of Claim 2.7, we can define a formula ψ(x¯, y¯) and
{b¯η : η ∈
ω>2} such that
ψ(x¯, b¯η) ≡
∧
q ∧
∧
{ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη}.
We claim that ψ(x¯, y¯) and 〈b¯η : η ∈
ω>2〉 exemplify SOP2 of T , which
is then a contradiction (noting that ψ is a formula of the form ϕn for some
n, where ϕn was defined in the statement of the Claim). We check the two
properties from Definition 2.2(1).
To see (a), let η ∈ ω2 be given. We have that pη is consistent, and q ⊆ pη.
For n < ω, we have
ψ(x¯, b¯η↾n) ≡
∧
q ∧
∧
{ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη↾n}.
As this is a conjunction of a set of formulae each of which is from pη, we have
that {ψ(x¯, b¯η↾n) : n < ω} is consistent. To check (b), suppose η ⊥ ν ∈
ω>2.
Let n be such that η ↾ n = ν ↾ n but η(n) 6= ν(n). Hence
ψ(x¯, b¯η) ≡
∧
q ∧
∧
{ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη↾n⌢η(n)}
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and
ψ(x¯, b¯ν) ≡
∧
q ∧
∧
{ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ) : ρ ∈ wη↾n⌢ν(n)},
so taken together, the two are contradictory by the choice of q.
We conclude that the choice of νη and wη cannot be carried throughout
η ∈ ω1>2. So, there is α < ω1 and η ∈
α2 such that νη, wη⌢〈l〉, νη⌢〈l〉 for l < 2
cannot be chosen, and α is the first ordinal for which there is such η. Let
ν0η ∈
ω1>2 ⊲ ∪β<ανη↾β ⌢ 〈η(α− 1)〉 if the latter part is defined, otherwise let
ν0η ⊲ ∪β<ανη↾β . This choice of νη = ρ for any ρ D ν
0
η with ρ ∈
ω12 satisfies
items (i)-(iii) above. We conclude that wη⌢〈l〉 for l < 2 using any ρD ν
0
η with
ρ ∈ ω1>2 for νη could not have been chosen, and examine why this is so. Note
that pη is already defined. Let
Θ
def
=


(ρ, γ, w) : ν0η ⊳ ρ ∈
ω12,
lg(ν0η) ≤ γ < ω1,
(∃ℵ1β < ω1)(ρ(β) = 1),
w ⊆ {Υ ∈ ω1>2 : ρ ↾ γ E Υ} is finite and
for some βρ < ω1 the set
pη ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ↾β) : ρ(β) = 1 & β ∈ [βρ, ω1)}∪
∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯Υ) : Υ ∈ w}
is consistent


.
We make several observations:
(0) If (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ and w ⊆ w′ with w′ finite and w′ \ w is contained in
{ρ ↾ β : βρ ≤ β ∧ ρ(β) = 1}, then (ρ, γ, w
′) ∈ Θ.
[This is obvious.]
(1) If (ρl, γ, wl) ∈ Θ and for some σ ∈
ω1>2 with ν0η E σ we have σ ⌢ 〈l〉 ⊳ ρl ↾ γ
for l < 2, while ρ0 and ρ1 are eventually equal, then (ρl, lg(σ), w0 ∪w1) ∈ Θ.
[Why? We have wl ⊆ {Υ ∈
ω1>2 : ρl ↾ γ E Υ} is finite, so clearly
w0 ∪ w1 ⊆ {Υ ∈
ω1>2 : σ E Υ} is finite. By the assumption, we have that
for some βl < ω1 for l < 2
pη ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρl↾β) : β > βl ∧ ρl(β) = 1} ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯Υ) : Υ ∈ wl}
is consistent. Suppose that (1) is not true with l = 0 and let β∗ ≥ max{β0, β1}
be such that β∗ < ω1 and for β > β
∗ the equality ρ0(β) = ρ1(β) holds. Hence
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we have that
pη ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯ρ0↾β) : β > β
∗ ∧ ρ0(β) = 1} ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯Υ) : Υ ∈ w0 ∪ w1}
is inconsistent. By increasing w0 if necessary, (0) implies that
pη ∪ {ϕ(x¯, a¯Υ) : Υ ∈ w0 ∪ w1}
is inconsistent. Let νη
def
= σ, for l < 2 let wη⌢〈l〉 = wl, and let νη⌢〈l〉
def
= ρl ↾ β
∗
l
for a large enough β∗l so that β
∗ < β∗l and max({lg(Υ) : Υ ∈ wη⌢〈l〉}) < β
∗
l .
This choice shows that we could have chosen νη, wη⌢〈l〉 as required, contra-
dicting the choice of η.]
(2) If ν0η ⊳ ρ ∈
ω12 for some ρ such that there are ℵ1 many β < ω1 with
ρ(β) = 1, and lg(ν0η) ≤ γ < ω1, then (ρ, γ, ∅) ∈ Θ.
[Why? By the choice of pη and the remark about the freedom in the
choice of ρ∗ that we made earlier.]
Now we use the choice of η to define witnesses to T being SOP1 which
also satisfy the requirements of the Claim. For τ ∈ ω>2, let b¯τ
def
= a¯ν0η⌢τ . Let
us check the required properties. Properties (a),(b) and (d) follow from the
choice of {a¯σ : σ ∈
ω1>2}. Let X∗ ⊆ ω>2 be such that there are no σ, ν ∈ X∗
with σ ⌢ 〈0〉 E ν, we need to show that {ϕ(x¯, b¯τ ) : τ ∈ X
∗} is consistent.
It suffices to show the same holds when X∗ replaced by an arbitrary finite
X ⊆ X∗. Fix such an X . Clearly, it suffices to show that for some ρ, γ,
letting w = {ν0η ⌢ τ : τ ∈ X}, we have (ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ.
Let ρ∗ ∈ ω12 be such that ν0η ⊳ ρ
∗ and ρ∗(β) = 1 for ℵ1 many β. By
induction on n
def
= |X| we show:
there is ρ ∈ ω12 such that for some γ ≥ max{lg(σ) : σ ∈ w}, we have
(ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ and β > γ =⇒ ρ(β) = ρ∗(β), while ρ(γ) = 1.
n = 0. Follows by observation (2) above.
n = 1. Let X = {τ} and γ = lg(τ) + lg(ν0τ ). Let ρ ∈
ω12 be such that
ρ ↾ γ = ν0η ⌢ τ , ρ(γ) = 1 and β > γ =⇒ ρ(β) = ρ
∗(β). By observation
(2) above, we have that (ρ, γ, ∅) ∈ Θ. Then, by observation (0), we have
(ρ, γ, w) ∈ Θ.
n = k + 1 ≥ 2. Case 1. w is linearly ordered by ⊳.
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Let τ ∈ w be of maximal length, so clearly σ ∈ w\{τ} =⇒ σ ⌢ 〈1〉 E τ .
Let ρ ∈ ω12 be such that τ ⌢ 〈1〉 ⊳ ρ and β > lg(τ), while ρ(β) = ρ∗(β).
Now continue as in the case n = 1.
Case 2. Not Case 1.
Let σ ∈ ω1>2 be ⊳-maximal such that (∀τ)(τ ∈ w =⇒ σ E τ). This
is well defined, as w 6= ∅ is finite. Let wl
def
= {τ ∈ w : σ ⌢ 〈l〉 E τ}, so
w0 ∩ w1 = ∅ but neither of w0, w1 is empty. Now we have that σ /∈ w, as
otherwise we could choose τ ∈ w0 such that σ ⌢ 〈0〉 E τ , obtaining an easy
contradiction with our assumptions on X . Hence w = w0 ∪w1. We can now
use observation (1) and the inductive hypothesis. ⋆2.19
To complete this discussion of the syntactic properties (N)SOP1, 2 we
shall quote a result from [ShUs 844] in which the understanding of SOP′1
and the witnesses for SOP1 developed here was used to show that NSOP1
theories admit a rank function.
Definition 2.21 Given (partial) types p(x¯), q(y¯) and a formula ϕ(x¯, y¯). By
induction on n < ω we define when
rk1ϕ(x¯,y¯)(p(x¯), q(y¯)) ≥ n.
n = 0. This happens iff both p(x¯) and q(y¯) are consistent.
n+ 1. The rank is ≥ n + 1 iff for some c¯ realising q(y¯) both
rk1ϕ(x¯,y¯)(p(x¯) ∪ {ϕ(x¯, c¯)}, q(y¯)) ≥ n
and
rk1ϕ(x¯,y¯)(p(x¯), q(y¯) ∪ {¬(∃x¯)(ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∧ ϕ(x¯, c¯))}) ≥ n.
If the rank is ≥ n for all n then we say it is inifinite, otherwise we say it is
finite.
Theorem 2.22 (Shelah-Usvyatsov [ShUs 844]) A theory T is NSOP1 iff
rk1ϕ(x¯,y¯)(x¯ = x¯, y¯ = y¯) <∞
for every formula ϕ(x¯, y¯).
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3 ⊳∗-maximality revisited
In this section we come back to our main thesis, which is that properties
SOP2 and the maximality in the ⊳
∗-order are closely connected.
Our main proof will use two auxiliary notions. The first is the order ⊳∗∗λ ,
which is a version of the ⊳∗λ-order.
Definition 3.1 (1) For (complete first order theories) T1, T2 and a regular
cardinal λ > |T1|, |T2|, let T1 ⊳
∗∗
λ T2 mean:
There is a λ-relevant (T1, T2)-superior (T
∗, ϕ¯, ψ¯) (see Definition 1.2) such
that T ∗ has Skolem functions and if T ∗∗ ⊇ T ∗ is complete with |T ∗∗| < λ
then
(⊕) there is a model M of T ∗∗ of size λ and an M [ψ¯]-type p omitted by
M such that for every elementary extension N of M of size λ which omits p
and a type q (in one variable) over N [ϕ¯], there is an elementary extension of
N of size λ which realises q and omits p.
(2) Let T1 ⊳
∗∗ T2 mean that T1 ⊳
∗∗
λ T2 holds for all large enough regular λ.
(3) T1 is said to be ⊳
∗∗
λ -maximal iff there is no T2 such that T1 ⊳
∗∗
λ T2.
Similarly for ⊳∗∗.
The connection between this notion and ⊳∗ is given by the following
claim:
Claim 3.2 Suppose that T1, T2 are theories and λ > |T1|, |T2| satisfies 2
λ = λ+.
Then
T1 ⊳
∗
λ+ T2 =⇒ ¬(T2 ⊳
∗∗
λ T1).
Proof. This statement is just a reformulation of the beginning of the proof
of Theorem 1.17. In other words, let (T, ϕ¯1, ϕ¯2) show that T1 ⊳
∗
λ+ T2. This
means that |T | < λ+ but since λ<λ = λ and λ > |T1|, |T2| we may assume
that |T ∗| < λ. Namely since there is a consistent theory T ⊇ ϕ¯1 ∪ ϕ¯2 in
which ϕ¯l interprets Tl, and each Tl has size < λ, there is a consistent theory
T ′ of size < λ which does the same. Without loss of generality T ′ ⊆ T . In
particular |τ(T ′)| < λ so by extending T ′ to a complete subtheory of T and
renaming we may assume T ′ is complete. Any model M of T has a reduct
N that is a model of T ′ and that satisfies M [ϕ¯] = N [ϕ¯] and similarly for ψ¯.
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Hence (T ′, ϕ¯, ψ¯) is a λ-relevant (T1, T2)-superior that exemplifies T1 ⊳
∗
λ+ T2,
so by renaming we may assume |T | < λ.
Suppose for contradiction that T2 ⊳
∗∗
λ T1 and let (T
∗, ϕ¯, ψ¯) exemplify this.
Without loss of generality, ϕ¯1 = ψ¯ and ϕ¯1 = ϕ¯ and the common vocabulary
of T and T ∗ is τ(ϕ¯1)∪ τ(ϕ¯2). Hence T
∗∗ = T ∪ T ∗ is consistent by Robinson
Consistency Criterium. Without loss of generality T ∗∗ is complete. Hence
let M be a model of T ∗∗ of size λ and p be a M [ψ¯] type omitted by M
exemplifying the definition of ⊳∗∗λ . Using the assumption 2
λ = λ+ we can
build by induction an elementary extension N of M with |N | = λ+, with N
omitting p and being ϕ¯-saturated. This is a contradiction with the choice of
T . ⋆3.2
Corollary 3.3 Suppose that for all large enough regular λ we have 2λ = λ+.
Then any ⊳∗-maximal theory is also ⊳∗∗-maximal.
Proof. Suppose otherwise and let T exemplify this. Hence for every κ there
is regular λ > κ such that T is not ⊳∗∗-maximal and 2λ = λ+. Hence T is
not ⊳∗
λ+
-maximal by Claim 3.2, a contradiction. ⋆3.3
The next notion we need is a syntactic property.
Definition 3.4 Let T be a theory.
(1) For a formula σ(x, y¯) we say that σ(x, y¯) has SOP′′2 iff for some [by
compactness equivalently all] regular λ > |T | there is a sequence
〈
e¯η¯ : η¯ = 〈η0, . . . ηn∗−1〉, η0 ⊳ η1 ⊳ . . . ⊳ ηn∗−1 ∈
λ>λ and lg(ηi) a successor
〉
such that
(α) for each η ∈ λλ, the set{
σ(x, e¯η¯) : η¯ = 〈η ↾ (α0 + 1), η ↾ (α1 + 1), . . . η ↾ (αn∗−1 + 1)〉
and α0 < α1 < . . . αn∗−1 < λ
}
is consistent
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(β) for every large enough m, if g : n
∗≥m→ λ>λ satisfies
ρ ⊳ ν =⇒ g(ρ) ⊳ g(ν)
and
ρ ∈ n≥m =⇒ lg(g(ρ)) is a successor,
while for l < n∗ − 1
(g(ρ))⌢ 〈l〉 E g(ρ ⌢ 〈l〉),
then
{σ(x, e¯〈g(ρ↾1),g(ρ↾2),...g(ρ)〉) : ρ ∈
n∗m}
is inconsistent. Here n∗ = lg(y¯) in σ(x, y¯).
(2) T is said to have SOP′′2 iff some σ(x, y¯) exemplifies it.
Our theorem 3.6 is phrased in terms of SOP′′2. Answering a question from
an earlier version of this paper Shelah and Usvyatsov proved in [ShUs 844]
the following Theorem 3.5, which then can be used together with theorem
3.6 to prove Corollary 3.9 which states that ⊳∗-maximality implies SOP2.
Theorem 3.5 (Shelah-Usvyatsov [ShUs 844]) For any theory T , T has SOP2
iff it has SOP′′2.
Main Theorem 3.6 For any theory T and regular cardinal λ > |T |, if T is
⊳∗∗λ -maximal then T has SOP
′′
2.
Proof. Let T be a given theory and let λ = cf(λ) > |T |. We shall assume
that T is ⊳∗∗λ -maximal and prove that T has SOP
′′
2. To make the reading of
the proof easier we shall break it into stages.
Stage A. Let T ntree
def
= Th(n≥2, <tr) for n < ω, where <=<tr stands for
the relation of “being an initial segment of”, and let Ttree
def
= lim〈T ntree : n < ω〉,
that is to say the set of all ψ which are in T ntree for all large enough n. In
order to use our assumptions at a later point, let us fix a theory T ∗ which
is a λ-relevant (Ttree, T )-superior with Skolem functions (such a T
∗ is easily
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seen to exist), and let ϕ¯, ψ¯ be the interpretations of Ttree and T in T
∗, respec-
tively. We can without loss of generality, by renaming if necessary, assume
that L(T ) ⊆ L(T ∗), so the interpretation ψ¯ is trivial.
As |T |, |T ∗| < λ, we can find A ⊆ λ which codes T and T ∗. Working in
L[A], we shall define a model M of T ∗ of size λ as follows. Let
Γ
def
= T ∗ ∪ {ϕ=(xη, xη) : η ∈
λ>λ}
∪ {xη <ϕ xν : η ⊳ ν ∈
λ>λ}
{¬(xη <ϕ xν) : ¬(η ⊳ ν) for η, ν ∈
λ>λ)}.
By a compactness argument and the fact that ϕ¯ interprets Ttree in T
∗, we see
that Γ is consistent. Let M be a model of Γ of size λ = λ<λ (as we are in
L[A]). For η ∈ λ>λ let aη be the realisation of xη in M . For η ∈
λλ, let
pη(x)
def
= {aη↾α <ϕ x : α < λ}
By the choice of M and the compactness argument it follows that each pη
is a (consistent) type. Note that for η0 6= η1 ∈
λλ, types pη0 and pη1 are
contradictory. Let
p′η(x) = {a <ϕ x : for some α < λ, a <ϕ aη↾α}.
By the axioms of Ttree, we have that pη and p
′
η are equivalent. Now we observe
that by the size of M there is η∗ ∈ λλ such that the type p′η∗ is omitted in
M , and p′η∗ is not definable in M , i.e. for no formula ϑ(y, z¯) and c¯ ⊆ M
do we have: for a ∈ M , the following are equivalent: [a <ϕ x] ∈ p
′
η∗ and
M |= ϑ[a, c¯]. Let p
def
= p′η∗ for such a fixed η
∗. For α < λ, let aα
def
= aη∗↾α. We
now go back to V and make an observation about M .
Subclaim 3.7 Ttree satisfies the following property:
for any formula ϑ(x, y¯) we have that Ttree ⊢ σ = σ(ϑ), where
σ ≡ (∀y¯)[[(∀x1, x2))ϑ(x1, y¯) ∧ ϑ(x2, y¯) =⇒ x1 ≤tr x2 ∨ x2 ≤tr x1)]
=⇒ (∃z)(∀x)(ϑ(x, y¯) =⇒ x ≤tr z)].
Proof of the Subclaim. Let ϑ(x, y¯) be given. By the definition of Ttree we
only need to show that T ntree ⊢ σ for all large enough n, which is obvious as
for every n the tree n≥2 has the top level. ⋆3.7
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Hence the interpretation ϕ¯ of Ttree in T
∗ satisfies the same statement
claimed about Ttree. We conclude:
⊗ if M ≺ N and p is not realised in N , then there is no ϑ(x, c¯) with
c¯ ⊆ N such that ϑ(aη∗↾α, c¯) for all α < λ holds and every two elements of N
satisfying ϑ(x, c¯) are <ϕ-comparable.
Stage B. We shall choose a filtration M¯ = 〈Mi : i < λ〉 of M , and an
increasing sequence 〈αi : i < λ〉, requiring:
(a) Mi ≺M and Mi are ≺-increasing continuous of size < λ, with M being
the
⋃
i<λMi,
(b) aαi ∈Mi+1 \Mi.
We may note that the branch induced by {aαi : i < λ} is the same as the
one induced by {aα : α < λ}. Hence p is realised in any model in which
p′(x)
def
= {aαi <ϕ x : i < λ} is realised (or even the similarly defined type
using any unbounded subset of {αi : i < λ}). Hence, by renaming, without
loss of generality we have αi = i for all i < λ.
Stage C. At this point we shall use the ⊳∗∗λ -maximality of T , which
implies that it is not true that T ⊳∗∗λ Ttree. In particular, our T
∗, M and p
do not exemplify this, hence there is N with M ≺ N and ||N || = λ, such
that N omits p, but for some N [ψ¯]-type q over N , whenever N ≺ N+ and N+
realises q, also N+ realises p. By ⊗, the branch induced by {aη∗ ↾ α : α < λ}
is not definable in N , so without loss of generality N = M . We can also
assume that q is a complete type over M [ψ¯]. Let us now use the choice of q
to define for each club E of λ a family of formulae associated with it, and
to show that each of these families is inconsistent. We use the abbreviation
c.d. for “the complete diagram of”.
For any club E of λ we define
ΓE
def
= c. d.(M) ∪ q(x) ∪ {¬(ai <ϕ τ(x, b¯)) : i ∈ E, τ a term of T
∗, b¯ ⊆Mi}.
Clearly, for any club E, if ΓE is consistent then there is a model N in which
ΓE is realised. Identifying any b ∈M with its interpretation in N and letting
a∗ be the interpretation of x from ΓE, we can assume that N is an elementary
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extension of M in which q is realised by a∗. As T ∗ has Skolem functions, we
have M ≺ N . Let N1 be the submodel of N with universe
A∗
def
= M ∪
⋃
i∈E
{τ(a∗, b¯) : b¯ ⊆Mi and τ a term of T
∗}.
Note that the size of N1 is λ. Clearly, N1 is closed under the functions of T
∗,
so M ⊆ N1 ⊆ N . As T
∗ has Skolem functions, we get that M ≺ N1 ≺ N .
By the third part of the definition of ΓE , p is omitted in N1. This is in
contradiction with our assumptions, as a∗ ∈ N1 realises q(x).
Hence we can conclude
for every club E of λ, the set ΓE is inconsistent.
Stage D. Now we start our search for a formula that exemplifies that T
has SOP′′2. In the following definitions, we shall use the expression “an almost
branch” or the abbreviation a.b. to stand for a set linearly ordered by <ϕ
(but not necessarily closed under <ϕ-initial segments and not necessarily
unbounded). Let
Θ0T ∗
def
=


ϑ(x, y, z¯) : there is l = lϑ < ω such that
for every M∗ |= T ∗, a ∈M∗, c¯ ⊆M∗, the set
ϑ(a, y, c¯)M
∗
is the union of ≤ l a.b. in M∗[ϕ¯]

 ,
and let ΘT ∗ be the set of all ϑ(x, y¯, z¯) of the form
∨
j<n ϑj(x, yj, z¯j) for some
ϑ0, . . . ϑn−1 ∈ Θ
0
T ∗ (where y¯ = 〈yj : j < n〉 and z¯ =
⌢
j<nz¯j). The formulae in
ΘT ∗ will be called candidates. For every candidate
ϑ(x, y¯, z¯) ≡
∨
j<n
ϑj(x, yj, z¯j)
and a ψ¯-formula σ(x, t¯), we consider the following game an,σ,ϑ (whose defini-
tion also depends on our fixed p, q and M¯), played by two players ∃ and ∀.
The game starts by ∃ playing b¯0 from lg(z¯0)M , then ∀ playing α0 < λ. After
that ∃ chooses β0 ∈ (α0, λ) and b¯
1 ∈ lg(z¯1)M such that b¯0 ∈ lg(z¯0)Mβ0 , after
which ∀ chooses α1 < λ etc., finishing by ∃ choosing b¯
n−1 ∈ lg(z¯n−1)M and ∀
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choosing αn−1, while ∃ chooses βn−1 ∈ (αn−1, λ) such that b¯
n−1 ∈ lg(z¯n−1)Mβn−1 .
Player ∃ wins this game iff for some e¯ ∈ lg(t¯)M we have
σ(x, e¯) ∈ q and M |= (∀x)[σ(x, e¯) =⇒ ϑ(x, 〈aβ0 , . . . , aβn−1〉,
⌢
k<nb¯
k)]. (⊗1)
(Note: the constants aβk are from the set {ai : i < λ} we chose above.)
Observe that every sequence 〈α0, . . . αn−1〉 ∈
nλ is an admissible sequence of
moves for ∀.
We shall show that for some n ≥ 1 and σ, ϑ, player ∃ has a winning
strategy in the game an,σ,ϑ, where ϑ =
∨
j<n ϑj as above. As these are
determined games, it suffices to show that for some n ≥ 1 and σ, ϑ, player ∀
does not have a winning strategy. Suppose that this is not the case, arguing in
(H(χ),∈, <∗χ, M¯ , p, q), where χ is large enough and <
∗
χ is a fixed well ordering
ofH(χ). Fix for a moment (n, σ, ϑ). Player ∀ has a winning strategy in an,σ,ϑ,
which, replacing the ordinals αl by constants aαl , can be represented by a
sequence of functions Gln,σ,ϑ for l < n (in (H(χ),∈, <
∗
χ, M¯ , p, q)), where for
l < n, if the play up to time l has been b¯0, α0, β0, . . . , αl−1, βl−1, b¯
l, then
Gln,σ,ϑ applied to this play is aαl for the αl in the choice of player ∀. We shall
assume that these functions are the <∗-first which can act in this manner.
Using this and elementarity, we notice that for every n, σ, ϑ the values of
Gln,σ,ϑ take place in M , and that
E0
def
= {δ < λ : (∀σ, ϑ)(∀n)(∀l < n)[M ∩ Skolem(H(χ),∈,M¯ ,Gl
n,σ,ϑ
)(Mδ) = Mδ]}
is a club of λ (as |T ∗|, ||Mi|| < λ for all i and M¯ is increasing continuous).
Let E
def
= acc(E0). Consider now the set ΓE. It is contradictory, so there is a
finite subset of it which is contradictory. Hence for some n0, n1, n2 < ω and
formulae ̺l(z¯l) (l < n0) from the c.d.(M), formulae σk(x, e¯k) (k < n1) ∈ q(x),
ordinals δ0 < . . . < δn2−1 ∈ E, a sequence 〈b¯j,l : j < n2, l < lj〉 with b¯j,l ⊆Mδj
and terms 〈τj,l : j < n2, l < lj〉 of T
∗, the following is inconsistent:∧
l<n0
̺l(z¯l) ∧
∧
k<n1
σk(x, e¯k) ∧
∧
j<n2,l<lj
¬
(
aδj <ϕ τj,l(x, b¯j,l)
)
.
As ̺l come from the c.d.(M) and q(x) is a complete type over M
[ψ¯], we may
assume that n0 = 1 and n1 = 1. Note that we must have n2 ≥ 1 and that
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there is no loss of generality in assuming that b¯j,l = b¯j for all l < lj for j < n.
We shall omit the subscript 0 from ̺, σ, e¯. Let n = n2 and let us define
ϑj(x, yj, z¯j) for j < n by
ϑj(x, yj, z¯j) ≡
∨
l<lj
yj <ϕ τj,l(x, z¯j),
and let ϑ =
∨
j<n ϑj . Note that for each j we have that ϑj ∈ Θ
0
T ∗ , as <ϕ is
a tree order. Hence ϑ is a candidate, σ(x, e¯) ∈ q(x), and since M |= ̺[d¯] for
some d¯ we have
M |= (∀x)[σ(x, e¯) =⇒
∨
j<n
ϑj(x, aδj , b¯j)]. (∗)
Now we consider the following play of an,σ,ϑ. Let ∃ choose b¯0. Recall that
b¯0 ⊆ Mδ0 . The strategy G
0
n,σ,ϑ of ∀ yields an ordinal α0. By the choice of
E0 we have α0 < δ0 and b¯0 ∈ Mδ0 , so we can let ∃ choose β0 = δ0. Let ∃
choose b¯1 and then let ∀ choose α1 according to the strategy, etc. At the end
of the play, player ∀ should have won (as he/she used the supposed winning
strategy), but clearly (∗) implies that ∃ won, a contradiction.
Stage E. We conclude that (for our λ, M¯, p, q), for some σ, ϑ and n ≥ 1
the player ∃ has a winning strategy in the game an,σ,ϑ, call it St. Let us fix
n = n∗, σ, ϑ, and St and use them to get SOP′′2.
For any α¯ = 〈α0, . . . , αn−1〉 ∈
nλ, we can let 〈b¯α¯↾k, βα¯↾(k+1) : k < n〉 be the
sequence of moves that ∃ plays by following the winning strategy St in a play
in which ∀ plays α¯, as the dependence is as marked. Let E be a club of λ
such that if k ≤ n and α0 < . . . < αk−1 < δ ∈ E, then b¯
〈α0,...,αk−1〉 ∈ lg(z¯j)Mδ.
(Such a club can be found by a method similar to the one used in Stage D).
Renaming the Mi and ai’s, we can without loss of generality assume that
E = λ. For α¯ ∈ nλ let e¯α¯ be such that:
M |= ∀x[σ(x, e¯α¯) =⇒
∨
j<n
ϑj(x, aβα¯↾(j+1) , b¯
α¯↾(j+1)
j )].
Notice that σ is a formula in the language of T . We shall show that σ,
together with a conveniently chosen sequence of e¯η¯’s, exemplifies SOP
′′
2. The
proof now proceeds similarly to the proof of Main Claim 1.13. Namely
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Lemma 3.8 There are sequences
〈Nη : η ∈
λ>λ〉, 〈hη : η ∈
λ>λ〉
such that
(i) hη is an elementary embedding of Mlg(η) into CT ∗ with range Nη,
(ii) ν E η =⇒ hν ⊆ hη,
(iii) for α 6= β < λ and η ∈ λ>λ we have
hη⌢〈α〉(alg(η)) ⊥ϕ hη⌢〈β〉(alg(η)),
(iv) Nη0 ∩Nη1 = Nη0∩η1 for all η0, η1.
Proof of the Lemma. This Lemma has the same proof as that of Main
Claim 1.13 Stage B. In the notation of that proof, ignore bδi . When defining
Γ use
Γ = ∪α<λΓ
α
0 ∪ ∪α<λΓ
α
3 ∪ Γ4 ∪ Γ
+
2 ,
where Γ+2 = {x
α
0 ⊥ϕ x
β
0 : α 6= β < λ} and Γ
α
0 ,Γ
α
3 and Γ4 are defined as in
the proof of Main Claim 1.13, allowing for the replacement of λ>2 by λ>λ by
using {x¯α : α < λ} in place of {x¯0, x¯1}. Assumptions on Γα0 ,Γ
+
2 and Γ
α
3 are
analogous to the ones we made in that proof. Fact 1.16 still holds, except
that we drop the last set from the definition of r(x¯). The rest of the proof
is the same, recalling that the branch induced by {ai : i < λ} is undefinable
in M . ⋆3.8
Stage F. For η ∈ λλ, let hη
def
= ∪α<λhη↾α. Let qη
def
= hη(q), hence each
qη is a consistent type. For η¯ = 〈η0, . . . , ηn−1〉 and η0 ⊳ . . . ⊳ ηn−1 with
lg(ηi) = αi + 1, let e¯η¯
def
= hηn−1(e¯
〈α0,...αn−1〉).
Suppose now that η ∈ λλ is given, and consider the set
{σ(x, e¯η¯) : η¯ = 〈η ↾ (α0 + 1), . . . η ↾ (αn−1 + 1)〉 for some α0 < . . . αn−1 < λ}.
This set is a subset of qη, and is hence consistent. This proves property (α)
from the definition of SOP′′2. For (β), letm be large enough and g :
n≥m→ λ>λ
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be as in the statement of (β). For ρ ∈ nm let e¯gρ
def
= e¯〈g(ρ↾1),...g(ρ)〉 (note that
this is always defined). We shall now show that the set
{σ(x, e¯gρ) : ρ ∈
nm}
is inconsistent. Suppose otherwise, so let d ∈ CT ∗ realise it. For each ρ ∈
nm,
let ηρ ∈
λλ ⊇ g(ρ) and let α¯ρ
def
= 〈αρ0, . . . , α
ρ
n−1〉 satisfy lg(g(ρ ↾ k)) = α
ρ
k + 1
for k ≤ n, so for each k < n we have g(ρ ↾ (k + 1)) = ηρ ↾ (α
ρ
k + 1). Now we
have that for each ρ ∈ nm
(i) σ(x, e¯gρ) ≡ σ(x, hηρ↾(αρn−1+1)(e¯
α¯ρ)) ∈ qηρ ↾ σηρ(x)
(ii) Nηρ |= (∀x)[σ(x, e¯gρ) =⇒ ϑ(x, 〈hηρ(aβα¯ρ↾1 ), . . . hηρ(aβα¯ρ )〉,
⌢
j<nhηρ(b¯
α¯
ρ
j ))]
(hence the same holds in CT ∗),
(iii)
ϑ(x, 〈hηρ(aβα¯ρ↾1 ), . . . hηρ(aβα¯ρ )〉,
⌢
j<nhηρ(b¯
α¯
ρ
j )) =⇒∨
j<n
ϑj(x, hηρ(aβα¯ρ↾(j+1) ), hηρ(b¯
α¯ρ↾(j+1)
j ))
for our ϑ0, . . . ϑn−1.
For each ρ ∈ nm let j(ρ) < n be the first such that
ϑj(d, hηρ(aβα¯ρ↾(j+1) ), hηρ(b¯
α¯ρ↾(j+1)
j ))
holds. Let l∗ = max{lϑ0 , . . . , l
ϑ
n−1}.
As m is large enough, there are ρ0, . . . , ρl∗ ∈
nm such that j(ρs) = j
∗ for
all s ∈ {0, . . . , l∗}, while ρs ↾ j
∗ is fixed and ρs(j
∗) 6= ρt(j
∗) for s 6= t ≤ l∗.
(We use that there is a full l
∗+1≥n subtree t∗ of n≥m such that for all
ρ ∈ t∗ ∩ nm we have j(ρ) = j∗. Choose ρs belonging to t
∗ and splitting
at the level j∗). In particular, αρs0 = α0, . . . , α
ρs
j∗−1 = αj∗−1 is fixed, and so is
hηρs ↾ Mα∗j−1+1, but
g(ρs) ↾ (αj∗−1 + 2) for s ≤ l
∗ are incomparable in λλ. (∗∗)
Let α¯
def
= α¯ρ0 .
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For each ρ ∈ nm and k < n we have that b¯α¯
ρ↾(k+1)
∈ Mαρk+1 (by the
choice of E), so in particular b¯α¯
ρ↾j∗
∈ Mαρ
j∗−1
+1, and hence hηρs (b¯
α¯ρ↾j
∗
) is
a fixed b¯∗. By the choice of d and definitions of j∗, l∗ and ΘT ∗ , there are
s 6= t < lϑj∗ ≤ l
∗ such that hηρs (aβα¯ρs↾(j
∗+1) ) and hηρt (aβα¯ρt↾(j
∗+1) ) are on the
same almost branch. Now note that for all ρ we have
a
βα¯
ρ↾(j∗+1) ∈M
βα¯
ρ↾(j∗+1)
+1
\M
βα¯
ρ↾(j∗+1)
and βα¯
ρ↾(j∗+1)
> αρj∗ . Hence hηρs (aβα¯ρs↾(j
∗+1) ) and hηρt (aβα¯ρt↾(j
∗+1) ) are incom-
parable, by property (iii) in Lemma 3.8, a contradiction. This shows (β)
from the definition of SOP′′2, so finishing the proof. ⋆3.6
Putting this together with Corollary 3.3 and Shelah-Usvyatsov theorem
3.5 above we get the following corollary 3.9.
Corollary 3.9 (1) Suppose that T is a theory that is ⊳∗-maximal in some
universe of set theory in which 2λ = λ+ holds for all large enough regular λ.
Then T has SOP2.
(2) Suppose that T is a theory that is ⊳∗
λ+
-maximal in some universe of set
theory in which λ is regular and 2λ = λ+. Then T has SOP2.
Proof. (1) Let W be a universe of set theory in which 2λ = λ+ holds for all
large enough regular λ and in which T is ⊳∗-maximal. Hence by Corollary
3.3 T is ⊳∗∗-maximal in W and hence by Main Theorem 3.6 in W it satisfies
SOP′′2. By Shelah-Usvyatsov Theorem 3.5 above T satisfies SOP2 in W .
An application of the Compactness Theorem shows that satisfying SOP2 is
absolute, hence T satisfies SOP2 in V .
(2) This follows similarly, but more directly, from Main Theorem 3.6 and the
Shelah-Usvyatsov Theorem 3.5. ⋆3.9
This section hence provides us with the proof of one side of our thesis that
SOP2 and ⊳
∗-maximality are closely connected. Recall that Shelah proved in
[Sh 500] that SOP3 implies ⊳
∗-maximality. So an important open question
(provided that SOP3 are not actually equivalent, which we still do not know)
is
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Question 3.10 Does SOP2 imply ⊳
∗-maximality?
In a partial answer to this question posed in an earlier version of the
paper Shelan and Usvyatsov in Theorem 3.12 of [ShUs 844] provided a local
positive answer to this question, where by “local” we mean that they proved
that any theory with SOP2 is ⊳
∗ above Ttree when only types localised by a
certain formula are considered (see Definition 1.3).
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